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If It‘s Constitutional, Then What‘s the Problem?:  
The Use of Judicial Override in Alabama  
Death Sentencing 
Shannon Heery  
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has a long and unstable history with the death 
penalty. There are severe disagreements and ever-changing opinions 
about its existence and use; not even the Supreme Court has been 
clear or consistent with respect to the death penalty. However, in 
Furman v. Georgia
1
 the Court handed down a rule that has remained 
the basis for death penalty jurisprudence since its creation—the death 
penalty cannot be imposed in a manner that is arbitrary, 
discriminatory or capricious.
2
 The Court has never carved out an 
exception to this rule, and yet, as it stands today, Alabama is the 
exception. Alabama‘s death penalty sentencing scheme allows judges 
to overturn juries‘ life sentences and unilaterally impose a death 
sentence without a specific standard for doing so, a process known as 
―judicial override.‖3 This practice raises serious concerns about the 
constitutionality of Alabama‘s sentencing scheme.4  
Alabama has recently been subjected to a number of reviews 
regarding the structure of its death sentencing. Feeling Alabama is 
often inequitable when imposing the death penalty, many 
 
  J.D. (2010), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2005), University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. Thank you to Emily Hughes who provided insight for this Note and 
supported my intellectual and professional growth, guiding me to my current position as a 
public defender in New York City. I am very grateful to my parents, Jim and Pat Heery, my 
brothers, Jim, Chris, and Patrick Heery, and Zach Stendig for their love, support, and 
encouragement. A very special thank you to the staff of the Washington University Journal of 
Law & Policy for their hard work and dedication to finalizing this Note for publication. 
 1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
 2. Id.  
 3. See discussion infra Part I.D.4. 
 4. See discussion infra Part I.D.1. 
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commentators have noted a major reason is its unique use of 
standardless judicial override.
5
 Allowing a judge to impose a 
sentence of death after a twelve-member jury returns a sentence of 
life without parole raises serious ethical and legal concerns,
6
 
especially in light of the Supreme Court holding in Ring v. Arizona in 
2002.
7
 To address these concerns, this note urges the Supreme Court 
to reconsider Alabama‘s use of judicial override and find it 
unconstitutional. The Court should completely disallow the use of 
judicial override because it cannot effectively provide a method of 
imposing the death penalty that is not arbitrary in accordance with 
Furman v. Georgia, and because it violates the due process clause. In 
the alternative, the Court could find the statute unconstitutional as 
applied and replace it with an articulated clear standard and 
procedure that judges must follow when overriding a jury verdict of 
life without parole. 
If, however, the Supreme Court does not recognize that 
Alabama‘s use of judicial override is unconstitutional, it will be up to 
the Alabama legislature to take action to fix the inherent problem 
with the state‘s death sentencing. Given Alabama‘s current political 
climate and legislative trend, it is unlikely that this will yield any 
results; judicial override will continue to be in full effect in Alabama 
death sentencing. Legislation should narrow judicial override by 
providing clear requirements that the judge must satisfy before 
overriding a jury verdict. In addition, judicial override could be 
dramatically altered to increase fairness in sentencing by addressing 
other factors like the political election of judges and the lack of a 
statewide public defender system.  
This Note focuses on the history of Alabama‘s death sentencing 
law as a window into the rationale requiring abrupt change. Part I.A 
addresses the Supreme Court‘s death penalty jurisprudence following 
Furman v. Georgia. Part I.B follows with Supreme Court opinions 
regarding judicial override. Part I.C considers Apprendi v. New 
Jersey
8
 and Ring v. Arizona
9
 to demonstrate the increased role of the 
 
 5. See discussion infra Part I.D.4. 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.D.3–4. 
 7. 536 U.S. 584 (2002); see discussion infra Part I.C.  
 8. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol34/iss1/11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Judicial Override in Alabama Death Sentencing 349 
 
 
jury in capital sentencing. Part I.D explores Alabama‘s current state 
of judicial override through an examination of (1) its statutory 
scheme, (2) Alabama cases following Ring, (3) Alabama death 
penalty statistics, and (4) recent public outcry criticizing the system 
and the responses of state officials. Part II of this note analyzes the 
Alabama law and proposes changes.  
I. HISTORY: ARRIVAL AT MODERN DAY ALABAMA DEATH 
SENTENCING SCHEME 
A. The U.S. Supreme Court and the Death Sentence:  
The Importance of Balancing Factors 
The U.S. Supreme Court established the modern approach to 
death sentencing in 1972 with its decision in Furman v. Georgia.
10
 
Finding a number of existing state death penalty statutes 
unconstitutional,
11
 the Court held that for a statute to be 
constitutional, death sentences must not be imposed in an arbitrary, 
capricious,
12
 or discriminatory
13
 manner.  
 
 9. 536 U.S. 584.  
 10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). A five–four decision without a controlling opinion, 
the positions of Justices Stewart and White form the basis for the present day understanding of 
Furman. See id. at 306–10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310–14 (White, J., concurring). 
Justices Brennan and Marshall found the death penalty unconstitutional under all 
circumstances. See id. at 257–306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314–71 (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
 11. Id. at 256. Furman explicitly struck down Georgia‘s capital punishment statute 
(directly at issue in the case), as well as any other state and federal death penalty laws that did 
not comport with its ruling and were therefore in violation of the Eighth Amendment‘s cruel 
and unusual punishment clause. See id. at 239–40; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This 
effectively created a de facto death penalty moratorium while states amended their statutes.  
 12. ―[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence 
of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly 
imposed.‖ Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Cases following Furman maintain 
that the imposition of the death penalty must not be capricious. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 
468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984) (―If a State has determined that death should be an available penalty 
for certain crimes, then it must administer that penalty in a way that can rationally distinguish 
between those individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is 
not.‖ (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 873–80 (1983))).  
 13. ―[T]hese discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are 
pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of 
equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on ‗cruel and unusual‘ punishments.‖ 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 256–57. 
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In the 1976 Gregg v. Georgia opinion, the Court clarified 
Furman, upholding the death penalty as a constitutional punishment 
provided there were appropriate limitations in its application.
14
 
Following the concerns voiced in Furman, Gregg emphasized the 
need for jurors to have adequate guidelines in their decision-making 
process, including a consistent method for assessing both the 
aggravating
15
 and the mitigating
16
 factors in each case.
17
 Though it 
 
 14. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Court in Gregg stated: 
The basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who were being 
condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily. Under the procedures before the 
Court in that case, sentencing authorities were not directed to give attention to the 
nature or circumstances of the crime committed or to the character or record of the 
defendant. Left unguided, juries imposed the death sentence in a way that could only 
be called freakish. 
Id. at 206. 
 15. An aggravating factor or circumstance is generally determined by state statute. 
Alabama codifies its aggravating circumstances as follows: 
Aggravating circumstances shall be the following: 
(1) The capital offense was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; 
(2) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence to the person;  
(3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons;  
(4) The capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an 
accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, 
or attempting to commit, rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping;  
(5) The capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a 
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody;  
(6) The capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain;  
(7) The capital offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any 
governmental function or the enforcement of laws;  
(8) The capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel compared to other 
capital offenses;  
(9) The defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more persons by one act or 
pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct; or  
(10) The capital offense was one of a series of intentional killings committed by the 
defendant.  
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49 (LexisNexis 2005). Black‘s Law Dictionary defines an aggravating 
circumstance as ―[a] fact or situation that relates to a criminal offense or defendant and that is 
considered by the court in imposing punishment (esp. a death sentence).‖ BLACK‘S LAW 
DICTIONARY 277 (9th ed. 2009). 
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2010]  Judicial Override in Alabama Death Sentencing 351 
 
 
 
 16. A mitigating factor or circumstance is also generally determined by state statute and is 
defined as ―[a] fact or situation that does not bear on the question of a defendant‘s guilt but that 
is considered by the court in imposing punishment and especially in lessening the severity of a 
sentence.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 277. Significant mitigating factors are 
generally codified, but the power to consider mitigating circumstances cannot be limited by 
statute. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978). Therefore, mitigating factors can be 
anything that might be helpful to a particular defendant (e.g., history of childhood abuse, lack of 
stability in childhood, learning disabilities). See generally Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 
381–83, 390–93 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 516–17, 534–35 (2003); Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395–99 (2000) (describing mitigating factors and their effect). Alabama‘s 
statutory mitigating circumstances are codified as follows: 
Mitigating circumstances shall include, but are not be limited to, the following: 
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; 
(2) The capital offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant‘s conduct or consented to it;  
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital offense committed by another 
person and his participation was relatively minor; 
(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of 
another person; 
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; and 
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.  
§ 13A-5-51.  
 Section 13A-5-52 of the Alabama Code explicitly provides for additional mitigating 
circumstances to be considered that are not enumerated in section 13A-5-51. 
In addition to the mitigating circumstances specified . . . mitigating circumstances shall 
include any aspect of a defendant‘s character or record and any of the circumstances of 
the offense that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole instead of death, and any other relevant mitigating circumstance which 
the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole 
instead of death.  
§ 13A-5-52.  
 17. The Court recognized the importance of bifurcated capital trials and the need for 
proper identification of ―aggravating‖ and ―mitigating‖ factors during the penalty phase. Gregg, 
428 U.S. 189–96.  
In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be 
imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute 
that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. 
As a general proposition these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a 
bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information 
relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of 
the information. 
Id. at 195.  
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was the Georgia death penalty statute again at issue, the Court found 
that the revised version required the jury to balance mitigating and 
aggravating factors in a manner that led to consistent application of 
the death sentence.
18
 
In light of its landmark decisions in Furman and Gregg, the 
Supreme Court continued to define the constitutional standard for 
implementation of capital punishment by reviewing other state death 
penalty statutes. In Woodson v. North Carolina
19
 and Roberts v. 
Louisiana,
20
 the Court found that statutes that automatically imposed 
the death penalty for some cases of murder, without considering 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, violated the Eighth 
Amendment.
21
 From these decisions, a consistent theme emerged: the 
sentencer must weigh the individual aggravating and mitigating 
 
 18. The Gregg Court explained: 
The new Georgia sentencing procedures, by contrast [to the Georgia statutes at issue in 
Furman], focus the jury‘s attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the 
particularized characteristics of the individual defendant. While the jury is permitted 
to consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must find and identify at 
least one statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty of death. In this 
way the jury‘s discretion is channeled. 
Id. at 206 (emphasis added). 
 19. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 20. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 21. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304–05; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335–36. The Woodson Court 
determined that automatic imposition of the death penalty would weaken its holding in Gregg 
requiring an assessment of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Woodson, 428 U.S. 
at 304. The Court explained, ―[W]e believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for 
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and record 
of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally 
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.‖ Id. (citation omitted). 
 The Court distinguished Jurek v. Texas and Proffitt v. Florida from its Woodson and 
Roberts decisions, reasoning that the statutes in question in Jurek and Proffitt did not 
automatically impose the death sentence, but necessarily took into account mitigating and 
aggravating factors. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269 (1976) (examining a Texas statute 
requiring the jury to answer three questions during penalty phase: (1) Was defendant‘s conduct 
deliberate and with reasonable expectation that the death would result? (2) Would defendant 
probably be a continued threat to society? (3) Was defendant‘s conduct an unreasonable 
response to provocation by the deceased? If the jury believes the answer to each question is 
‗yes,‘ the death sentence is imposed); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (discussing 
statute in which trial judge must weigh eight statutory aggravating factors against seven 
statutory mitigating factors to determine sentence).  
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circumstances,
22
 in a measured fashion,
23
 to determine the appropriate 
sentence between life and death.
24
 
The following year, the Court determined that a death sentence 
was never acceptable for the specific crimes of rape, robbery, and 
felony murder without the intent to kill, because they could not rise to 
the necessary level of aggravation, and death would therefore be 
cruel and unusual punishment.
25
 These rulings significantly narrowed 
the scope of the death penalty. Though the Court permitted the death 
penalty for other crimes,
26
 these decisions led to states generally 
reserving the death penalty for the offense of capital murder.
27
  
Although the Supreme Court had clarified that without sufficient 
aggravating factors there could be no death penalty, it was initially 
reluctant to accept that a single mitigating characteristic could also 
mean the death penalty was not allowed for murder.
28
 However, in 
 
 22. A statute ―must also allow the sentencer to consider the individual circumstances of 
the defendant, his background, and his crime.‖ Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984) 
(citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)); see also Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (suggesting 
that sentencing depends on facts and circumstances of the individual and his crime). See also 
supra notes 15–16, for the Alabama statute regarding aggravating and mitigating factors.  
 23. In 1982, the Court renewed the basis of its Furman holding in Eddings v. Oklahoma 
when it noted the importance of the ―twin objectives‖ of ―measured, consistent application and 
fairness to the accused‖ in the imposition of the death sentence. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 
104, 110–11 (1982). 
 24. See id. (stating that the sentencer must consider all relevant mitigating evidence before 
making death sentence). 
 25. See generally Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (felony murder without the 
intent to kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (rape); Hooks v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 
(1977) (per curiam) (robbery). The Court later overturned Enmund in Tison v. Arizona, which 
held that felony murder participants who neither kill nor intend to kill but who participate with 
others in a felony that leads to murder could be sentenced to death if they (1) participate in a 
―major‖ way or (2) exhibit a ―reckless indifference to human life.‖ 481 U.S. 137, 163–64 
(1987). 
 26. The death penalty is still available for offenses other than murder. See generally Death 
Penalty for Offenses Other Than Murder, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.death 
penalty.org/death-penalty-offenses-other-murder (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
 27. Capital murders contain specific aggravating circumstances (determined by the state) 
that heighten the punishment of the murder to include the death penalty. For Alabama‘s 
definition of capital murder under Alabama Code section 13A-5-39 and a list of Alabama 
statutory capital offenses under Alabama Code section 13A-5-40, see infra note 79. 
 28. See generally Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 551 (2005) (upholding the constitutionality of laws permitting the execution 
of mentally retarded offenders); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the 
constitutionality of laws permitting the execution of juvenile offenders); McCleskey v. Kemp, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the face of statistical evidence and the underlying Furman rationale,
29
 
the Court found it unconstitutional to apply the death sentence to 
juveniles
30
 and the mentally retarded
31
 because each condition alone 
was a sufficient mitigating factor for first-degree murder.
32
  
Aside from these few clear instances where the death penalty was 
not allowed, the Court continued to individually evaluate the 
constitutionality of state death penalty statutes to ensure they 
properly provided for the weighing of aggravating and mitigating 
factors.
33
 The Court continues to uphold the balancing test as 
imperative to consistency and fairness in capital sentencing, even 
finding defense counsel who fail to gather and present applicable 
mitigating evidence to the jury to be in violation of a defendant‘s 
right to a fair trial.
34
 
 
481 U.S. 279 (1987) (upholding the imposition of death penalty despite strong statistical 
showing of racial bias in those sentenced to death in Georgia). 
 29. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
 30. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). 
 31. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (overruling the Court‘s holding in Penry).  
 32. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. 
 33. Compare Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 79–83 (1987) (striking down a Nevada 
statute automatically imposing the death penalty for prisoners convicted of murder and serving 
a life sentence without parole), Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427–29 (1980) (explaining 
that aggravating circumstances in a statute authorizing the death penalty must be defined in 
order to provide meaningful guidance and ensure reliability in sentencing), and Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U.S. 586, 606–08 (1978) (holding that the Ohio statute did not permit the type of 
individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments because it only specified three and required sentence of death if one of those three 
was not present), with Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993) (finding a lack of an explicit 
instruction by the judge to consider mitigating evidence about the defendant‘s age did not 
prevent the jury from considering it), Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377–79 (1990) 
(upholding California‘s jury instruction requiring imposition of the death penalty when 
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances), and Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 
494 U.S. 299, 306–09 (1990) (upholding the Pennsylvania law requiring a death penalty when 
at least one statutory aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances are present).  
 34. The Court established the current standard for determining whether a capital 
defendant‘s counsel acted incompetently in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984). The two-part test for making the determination required: (1) the defendant to show 
counsel‘s performance was deficient, causing serious errors so that counsel was not functioning 
as the ―counsel‖ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense, depriving the defendant of a fair trial with reliable results. Id. The 
Strickland test was rarely applied until the Court firmly established the importance of mitigating 
factors in sentencing. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). In Wiggins v. Smith, the 
Court found a death-row inmate‘s trial lawyers were inadequate counsel because they failed to 
investigate their client‘s severe childhood abuse. 539 U.S. 510, 534–35 (2003). Likewise, in 
Rompilla v. Beard, the Court found counsel ineffective even though they attempted to find 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol34/iss1/11
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B. The Supreme Court: Judges as Sentencers and Their Ability to 
Override a Jury Verdict 
Having firmly established the importance of consistency in 
applying the balancing test of capital sentencing, the Court faced the 
question of whether state statutes honored this requirement when the 
judge was permitted to determine the sentence of a capital 
defendant.
35
 Briefly addressing this issue in the 1976 case of Proffitt 
v. Florida, the Court examined part of the post-Furman Florida death 
penalty statute, which allowed judges to make the ultimate sentencing 
decision (overriding the jury‘s initial sentence if necessary) but 
required them to evaluate specifically enumerated aggravating and 
mitigating factors in the process.
36
 The Court stated that while it has 
recognized that ―jury sentencing in a capital case can perform an 
important societal function[], it has never suggested that jury 
sentencing is constitutionally required.‖37  
The Court expanded upon its holding in Proffitt with its Spaziano 
v. Florida
38
 decision in 1984. Though the Court decided in Proffitt 
that a judge could make the sentencing decision, the Spaziano Court 
specifically addressed whether it was constitutional for a judge to 
consider a jury verdict as merely advisory in nature (as defined by the 
Florida statute). In upholding the Florida statute, the Court provided 
strongly worded rationale,
39
 and concluded that:  
 
mitigating factors by interviewing the client, his family, and mental health experts, because they 
missed easily obtainable mitigating evidence present in public record. 545 U.S. 374, 389–93 
(2005). 
 35. See generally Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 
(1995); Schiro v. Indiana, 493 U.S. 910 (1989); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).  
 36. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 253–57. ―Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of 
the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a 
sentence of life imprisonment or death . . . .‖ FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1976–77); see FLA. 
STAT. § 921.141(5)–(6) (1976–77) (listing enumerated aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances a judge must consider); see also infra note 84 (describing this process according 
to Alabama law). 
 37. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252 (citation omitted); see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 
(1983) (upholding Florida‘s post-Furman statute as applying the death sentence in a consistent 
manner and therefore not constitutionally violative).  
 38. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 449; see FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)–(6). 
 39. The Court states that ―[t]he point is simply that the purpose of the death penalty is not 
frustrated by, or inconsistent with, a scheme in which the imposition of the penalty in individual 
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[T]he Sixth Amendment does not require jury sentencing, that 
the demands of fairness and reliability in capital cases do not 
require it, and that neither the nature of, nor the purpose 
behind, the death penalty requires jury sentencing, we [the 
Court] cannot conclude that placing responsibility on the trial 
judge to impose the sentence in a capital case is 
unconstitutional.
40
  
In essence, the Spaziano Court concluded that as long as the sentence 
is consistent and fair, judicial override is not unconstitutional.
41
  
Following the Court‘s assessment and approval of Florida‘s 
judicial override scheme,
42
 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of 
Alabama‘s death penalty statute in Harris v. Alabama.43 Though the 
Florida and Alabama statutes both allowed for judicial override, the 
Court needed to evaluate the crucial difference: Florida imposed a 
standard upon judges for their use of the override provision,
44
 
whereas Alabama‘s exercise of judicial override lacked an 
enumerated standard.
45
 Florida required that the sentencing judge 
 
cases is determined by a judge.‖ Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 462–63. Furthermore, the Court 
articulates its view by stating that:  
The fact that a majority of jurisdictions have adopted a different practice . . . does not 
establish that contemporary standards of decency are offended by the jury override. 
The Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion 
different from a majority of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws.  
Id. at 464.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. ―Judicial override‖ refers to the ability of a judge to make the final sentencing 
decision for a capital defendant when the final sentence is not in accord with the jury‘s 
recommendation. See id. at 463. 
 43. 513 U.S. 504 (1995). 
 44. See Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). 
 45. The Court was careful to avoid imposing Tedder: 
These statements of approbation . . . do not mean that the Tedder standard is 
constitutionally required. As we stated in Spaziano . . . ―[o]ur responsibility, however, 
is not to second-guess the deference accorded the jury‘s recommendation in a 
particular case, but to ensure that the result of the process is not arbitrary or 
discriminatory.‖ We thus made clear that, our praise for Tedder not withstanding, the 
hallmark of the analysis is not the particular weight a State chooses to place upon the 
jury‘s advice, but whether the scheme adequately channels the sentencer‘s discretion 
so as to prevent arbitrary results. 
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give jury recommendations ―great weight.‖46 In addition, under 
Tedder v. State, Florida required that before a judge can override a 
jury verdict, ―facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear 
and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.‖47 
Alabama only required that the judge ―consider the recommendation 
of the jury.‖48  
Despite the Court‘s implicit approval of Florida‘s more rigorous 
Tedder standard, it declined to find the Alabama statute 
unconstitutional.
49
 The Court had previously held the Constitution did 
not require either ―a specific method for balancing mitigating and 
aggravating factors . . . in capital sentencing proceeding[s],‖50 or ―a 
State to ascribe any specific weight to particular factors . . . to be 
considered by the sentencer.‖51 Requiring that Alabama adhere to the 
Florida ―great weight‖ Tedder standard ―would offend these 
established principles and place within constitutional ambit 
micromanagement tasks that properly rest within the State‘s 
discretion to administer its criminal justice system.‖52 The Harris 
court went on to conclude, ―the Eighth Amendment does not require 
the State to define the weight the sentencing judge must accord an 
advisory jury verdict.‖53 Additionally, the Court found that ―[t]he 
Constitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital 
sentence. It is thus not offended when a State further requires the 
sentencing judge to consider the jury‘s recommendation and trusts 
the judge to give it the proper weight.‖54 
 
Harris, 513 U.S. at 511 (quoting Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 465) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Judge 
Override, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, http://www.eji.org/eji/deathpenalty/override (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2010). 
 46. See Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910.  
 47. Id. 
 48. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (LexisNexis 2005) (providing that ―[w]hile the jury‘s 
recommendation shall be given consideration, it is not binding on the court‖); see also Harris v. 
Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 508–09 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 49. Harris, 513 U.S. at 514–15. 
 50. Id. at 512 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988)).  
 51. Id.; see, e.g., Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 
U.S. 242, 257–58 (1984); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).  
 52. Harris, 513 U.S. at 512. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 515. 
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The Court commented on other points that arose in Harris.
55
 First, 
in response to the defendant‘s argument that the Alabama law was 
ineffectual and produced unintended results,
56
 the Court found ―[a]n 
ineffectual law is for the state legislature to amend, not for us to 
annul.‖57 Next, the Court addressed defense counsel‘s presentation of 
Alabama cases that attempted to demonstrate the inconsistent practice 
of judicial override.
58
 It concluded, ―these statements do not indicate 
that the judges have divergent understandings of the statutory 
requirement that the jury verdicts be considered; they simply 
illustrate how different judges have ‗considered‘ the jury‘s advice. 
There is no reason to expect that the advisory verdicts will be treated 
uniformly in every case.‖59 Finally, the Court implied that though the 
above arguments did not pass muster, there might be other 
constitutional challenges possible for the Alabama statute.
60
 
 
 55. See id.  
 56. Id. at 513–14 (defense counsel used statistical evidence to demonstrate judicial 
override was used predominantly to overturn life verdicts by a jury in order to impose death 
verdicts by a judge). 
 57. Id. at 514. 
 58. Defense counsel offered sentencing reports from various cases to demonstrate the 
wholly inconsistent and sometimes entirely nonexistent standard for imposing judicial override. 
Id. These cases included judicial rationale that: (1) offered no specification of reasons for 
rejecting the jury‘s advice; (2) noted he gave ―great weight‖ to the jury recommendation 
without elaborating; (3) said there was a ―reasonable basis‖ for override without elaborating; (4) 
stated the verdict was ―unquestionably a bizarre result‖; (5) found ―if this were not a proper 
case for the death penalty to be imposed, a proper case can scarcely be imagined.‖ Id. Defense 
counsel intended to show the arbitrary nature of imposition of the death sentence through 
judicial override. See id.  
 59. Id. The Court continued on to say that ―[t]he disparate treatment of jury verdicts 
simply reflects the fact that, in the subjective weighing process, the emphasis given to each 
decisional criterion must of necessity vary in order to account for the particular circumstances 
of each case.‖ Id. at 515; see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982). 
 60. The Harris Court explained: 
In any event, Harris does not show how the various statements affect her case. She 
does not bring an equal protection claim, and she does not contest the lower courts‘ 
conclusion that her sentence is proportionate to that imposed in similar cases. The 
sentiments expressed in unrelated cases do not render her punishment violative of the 
Eighth Amendment.  
513 U.S. at 515.  
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C. Ring v. Arizona: Increasing the Role of the Jury in Capital 
Sentencing 
Because the Harris decision seemed to clearly legitimize 
Alabama‘s judicial override statute, Alabama did little to create a 
more consistent standard for judicial override.
61
 Judges continued to 
override cases relying upon the same unclear and varied standards 
that had served as the bases for their prior decisions.
62
 However, 
beginning in 2000 with Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court 
started to require a greater role for the jury in sentencing.
63
 Apprendi 
found that it is ―unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the 
jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of 
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. . . . [S]uch facts 
must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.‖64 Thus, 
Apprendi established that a trial court violates the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial when it substitutes its judgment of factual findings 
that increase a defendant‘s sentence for that of a jury‘s.65 Though 
Apprendi did not specify what its holding would mean for capital 
 
 61. See generally ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-39 to -53 (LexisNexis 2005). 
 62. See, e.g., Apicella v. State, 809 So. 2d 841, 865 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (holding 
override permissible when the judge reevaluated the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
to find the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstance and that the 
defendant‘s behavior ―shocked the [c]ourt‖), aff’d sub nom., Ex parte Apicella, 809 So. 2d 865 
(Ala. 2001). For a synopsis of the rationale Alabama judges use in following Harris, see 
Katheryn K. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury Override in Alabama Death Penalty Cases, 
46 ALA. L. REV. 5 (1994). Through a study of 81 percent of Alabama capital sentencing orders 
employing judicial override from 1981–1991, Russell found that judges had a variety of reasons 
for ignoring advisory jury verdicts. Id.  
In four . . . cases, the trial court stated that it found that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating ones to a moral certainty . . . . In five . . . cases, the trial 
court concluded that the heinousness of the crime was pivotal to its decision to 
override. Three of these cases . . . also cite the deterrence rationale for capital 
punishment. In [one] case . . . the trial court offered a standard for its decision to 
override: ―The Court finds that there is a reasonable basis for enhancing the jury‘s 
recommendation of sentence.‖  
Id. at 31–32 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  
 63. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 64. Id. at 490 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252–53 (1999) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)).  
 65. See id. 
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cases,
66
 three years later the Court clarified that Apprendi would 
apply to capital sentencing in Ring v. Arizona.
67
 
The Ring Court held that ―[c]apital defendants, no less than 
noncapital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any 
fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum 
penalty.‖68 The Court relied on history,69 the Apprendi precedent,70 
and logic
71
 when it reasoned that ―[i]f it is constitutionally 
 
 66. See id. Much of the rationale of Apprendi was that judges could not unilaterally decide 
facts that constituted an element of the crime. See id. However, they were still able to make 
factual determinations regarding sentencing decisions without the jury. See id. The Court found 
that an element of a crime included, ―[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.‖ Id. This definition 
did nothing to clear up the lingering question of whether determinations of aggravating and 
mitigating factors in capital cases should be classified as merely part of the sentencing decision 
(and therefore able to be decided by a judge alone) or if they were instead considered an 
element of the crime that must be submitted to the jury for evaluation. See id.  
 However, the Apprendi court did at least implicitly suggest that its decision would not 
apply to capital cases. See id.; see also infra note 73. 
 67. 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). 
 68. Id. at 589. 
 69. The Ring Court determined: 
―If th[e] question had been posed in 1791, when the Sixth Amendment became law,‖ 
Justice Stevens said, ―the answer would have been clear,‖ for ―[b]y that time, ―the 
English jury‘s role in determining critical facts in homicide cases was entrenched. As 
fact-finder, the jury had the power to determine not only whether the defendant was 
guilty of homicide but also the degree of the offense. Moreover, the jury’s role in 
finding facts that would determine a homicide defendant’s eligibility for capital 
punishment was particularly well established. Throughout its history, the jury 
determined which homicide defendants would be subject to capital punishment by 
making factual determinations . . . . By the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, the 
jury‘s right to make these determinations was unquestioned.‖  
Id. at 599 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 710–11 (1990)). 
 The Ring court also noted ―[t]he guarantees of [a] jury trial in the Federal and State 
Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and 
justice administered. . . . If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the 
. . . judge, he was to have it.‖ Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 155–56 (1968)). 
 70. See supra notes 63–66. See generally Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466. ―We held that 
Apprendi‘s sentence violated his right to ‗a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every 
element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.‘‖ Ring, 536 U.S. at 
602 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477). ―A defendant may not be ‗expose[d] . . . to a penalty 
exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury 
verdict alone.‘‖ Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 (Scalia, J., concurring) (―[A]ll the facts 
which must exist in order to subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be 
found by the jury.‖).  
 71. ―If a State makes an increase in a defendant‘s authorized punishment contingent on 
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impermissible to allow a judge‘s finding to increase the maximum 
punishment for carjacking by 10 years, it is not clear why a judge‘s 
finding may increase the maximum punishment for murder from 
imprisonment to death.‖72  
Ring specifically overruled a prior Supreme Court case, Walton v. 
Arizona,
73
 ―to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting 
without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for 
imposition of the death penalty.‖74 The Ring court concluded that 
―[t]he right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding 
necessary to increase a defendant‘s sentence by two years, but not the 
factfinding necessary to put him to death. We hold that the Sixth 
Amendment applies to both.‖75  
D. Post-Ring: Alabama Judicial Override in Practice Today 
In the aftermath of Ring v. Arizona,
76
 the Alabama courts have 
narrowly interpreted Ring’s holding so that it has the smallest 
 
the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Ring, 536 U.S. at 602. 
The Sixth Amendment jury trial right . . . does not turn on the relative rationality, 
fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders. Entrusting to a judge the finding of facts 
necessary to support a death sentence might be ‗an admirably fair and efficient scheme 
of criminal justice designed for a society that is prepared to leave criminal justice to 
the State. . . . The founders of the American Republic were not prepared to leave it to 
the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the least controversial 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been efficient; but it has always been free. 
Id. at 607 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 72. Id. at 601 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 272 (1999) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting)). 
 73. 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (holding determination of aggravating factors in capital sentence 
by trial judge instead of jury is constitutionally permissible). Apprendi did not overturn Walton, 
but rather distinguished it by stating ―once a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the 
elements of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be 
left to the judge to decide whether the maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, ought to be 
imposed.‖ Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 
224, 257 n.2 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). The Ring court addressed this, specifically stating 
that ―we hold that Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable; our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
cannot be home to both.‖ Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.  
 74. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.  
 75. Id.  
 76. See id.  
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possible impact on Alabama‘s statutory capital sentencing 
provisions.
77
  
1. Alabama Death Sentencing Statutes and Procedure 
To sentence a defendant to death, the process must begin in the 
guilt phase as the jury determines whether the crime is also a capital 
offense
78
 as defined by section 13A-5-40 of the Alabama Code.
79
 If 
 
 77. In order to fully grasp the courts‘ interpretation of Ring in light of their statutes, see 
the applicable Alabama statutes, including ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-43(a), (d), 13A-5-45, 13A-5-
53 (LexisNexis 2005). 
 78. Id. § 13A-5-43(a), (d) (provisions on trial of capital offenses and sentencing). 
(a) In the trial of a capital offense the jury shall first hear all the admissible evidence 
offered on the charge or charges against the defendant. It shall then determine whether 
the defendant is guilty of the capital offense or offenses with which he is charged . . . . 
. . . . 
(d) If the defendant is found guilty of a capital offense or offenses with which he is 
charged, the sentence shall be determined as provided in Sections 13A-5-45 through 
13A-5-53. 
Id.  
 79. Section 13A-5-39(1) of the Alabama Code defines a capital offense as an offense for 
which a defendant shall be punished by a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole. 
This definition is clarified by section 13A-5-40 of the Alabama Code, which lists capital 
offenses. 
(a) The following are capital offenses:  
(1) Murder by the defendant during a kidnapping in the first degree or an attempt 
thereof committed by the defendant. 
(2) Murder by the defendant during a robbery in the first degree or an attempt thereof 
committed by the defendant. 
(3) Murder by the defendant during a rape in the first or second degree or an attempt 
thereof committed by the defendant; or murder by the defendant during sodomy in the 
first or second degree or an attempt thereof committed by the defendant. 
(4) Murder by the defendant during a burglary in the first or second degree or an 
attempt thereof committed by the defendant. 
(5) Murder of any police officer, sheriff, deputy, state trooper, federal law enforcement 
officer, or any other state or federal peace officer of any kind, or prison or jail guard, 
while such officer or guard is on duty, regardless of whether the defendant knew or 
should have known the victim was an officer or guard on duty, or because of some 
official or job-related act or performance of such officer or guard. 
(6) Murder committed while the defendant is under sentence of life imprisonment. 
(7) Murder done for a pecuniary or other valuable consideration or pursuant to a 
contract or for hire. 
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the jury convicts the defendant of a capital offense under 13A-5-40, 
the case proceeds to sentencing where the state has the burden of 
proving the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance
80
 
beyond a reasonable doubt.
81
 Many of the aggravating circumstances 
 
(8) Murder by the defendant during sexual abuse in the first or second degree or an 
attempt thereof committed by the defendant. 
(9) Murder by the defendant during arson in the first or second degree committed by 
the defendant; or murder by the defendant by means of explosives or explosion. 
(10) Murder wherein two or more persons are murdered by the defendant by one act or 
pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct. 
(11) Murder by the defendant when the victim is a state or federal public official or 
former public official and the murder stems from or is caused by or is related to his 
official position, act, or capacity.  
(12) Murder by the defendant during the act of unlawfully assuming control of any 
aircraft by use of threats or force with intent to obtain any valuable consideration for 
the release of said aircraft or any passenger or crewmen thereon or to direct the route 
or movement of said aircraft, or otherwise exert control over said aircraft.  
(13) Murder by a defendant who has been convicted of any other murder in the 20 
years preceding the crime; provided that the murder which constitutes the capital crime 
shall be murder as defined in subsection (b) of this section; and provided further that 
the prior murder conviction referred to shall include murder in any degree as defined at 
the time and place of the prior conviction.  
(14) Murder when the victim is subpoenaed, or has been subpoenaed, to testify, or the 
victim had testified, in any preliminary hearing, grand jury proceeding, criminal trial 
or criminal proceeding of whatever nature, or civil trial or civil proceeding of whatever 
nature, in any municipal, state, or federal court, when the murder stems from, is caused 
by, or is related to the capacity or role of the victim as a witness.  
(15) Murder when the victim is less than fourteen years of age. 
(16) Murder committed by or through the use of a deadly weapon fired or otherwise 
used from outside a dwelling while the victim is in a dwelling.  
(17) Murder committed by or through the use of a deadly weapon while the victim is 
in a vehicle. 
(18) Murder committed by or through the use of a deadly weapon fired or otherwise 
used within or from a vehicle. 
Id. § 13A-5-40. 
 80. See supra note 15 (listing Alabama‘s aggravating circumstances under section 13A-5-
49 of the Alabama Code).  
 81. § 13A-5-45(a) to -45(g) (addressing sentence hearing provisions: delays, statements 
and arguments, admissibility of evidence, burden of proof, mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances). 
(a) Upon conviction of a defendant for a capital offense, the trial court shall conduct a 
separate sentence hearing to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to life 
imprisonment without parole or to death. The sentence hearing shall be conducted as 
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required in the penalty phase under section 13A-5-49 overlap with 
elements required to convict a defendant of a capital offense under 
section 13A-5-40 in the guilt phase,
82
 and therefore this requirement 
is often already fulfilled by the penalty phase.
83
 In accordance with 
the process outlined in section 13A-5-46, the jury then weighs the 
 
soon as practicable after the defendant is convicted. Provided, however, if the sentence 
hearing is to be conducted before the trial judge without a jury or before the trial judge 
and a jury other than the trial jury, as provided elsewhere in this article, the trial court 
with the consent of both parties may delay the sentence hearing until it has received 
the pre-sentence investigation report specified in Section 13A-5-47(b). Otherwise, the 
sentence hearing shall not be delayed pending receipt of the pre-sentence investigation 
report.  
(b) The state and the defendant shall be allowed to make opening statements and 
closing arguments at the sentence hearing. The order of those statements and 
arguments and the order of presentation of the evidence shall be the same as at trial.  
(c) At the sentence hearing evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court 
deems relevant to sentence and shall include any matters relating to the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances referred to in Sections 13A-5-49, 13A-5-51 and 13A-5-
52. Evidence presented at the trial of the case may be considered insofar as it is 
relevant to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances without the necessity of re-
introducing that evidence at the sentence hearing, unless the sentence hearing is 
conducted before a jury other than the one before which the defendant was tried.  
(d) Any evidence which has probative value and is relevant to sentence shall be 
received at the sentence hearing regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary 
rules of evidence, provided that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut 
any hearsay statements. This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the 
introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United 
States or the State of Alabama.  
(e) At the sentence hearing the state shall have the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating circumstances. Provided, however, 
any aggravating circumstance which the verdict convicting the defendant establishes 
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial shall be considered as proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt for purposes of the sentence hearing.  
(f) Unless at least one aggravating circumstance as defined in Section 13A-5-49 exists, 
the sentence shall be life imprisonment without parole.  
(g) The defendant shall be allowed to offer any mitigating circumstance defined in 
Sections 13A-5-51 and 13A-5-52. When the factual existence of an offered mitigating 
circumstance is in dispute, the defendant shall have the burden of interjecting the issue, 
but once it is interjected the state shall have the burden of disproving the factual 
existence of that circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Id.  
 82. Compare § 13A-5-49, with § 13A-5-40. 
 83. See Ex Parte McGriff, 908 So. 2d 1024, 1037 (Ala. 2004) (requiring unanimous 
finding of the statutory aggravating circumstance in the penalty phase). This finding is 
independent of the finding of the initial aggravating component in the guilt phase.  
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aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine whether the 
sentence will be life without parole or death.
84
 The Alabama Code 
makes clear that this verdict is merely advisory.
85
 Once the jury 
renders its verdict the judge proceeds to make the final sentencing 
decision in accordance with section 13A-5-47 of the Alabama Code.
86
  
 
 84. § 13A-5-46(a), (d)–(g). 
(a) Unless both parties with the consent of the court waive the right to have the 
sentence hearing conducted before a jury . . . it shall be conducted before a jury which 
shall return an advisory verdict as provided by subsection (e) of this section. . . .  
. . . . 
(d) After hearing the evidence and the arguments of both parties at the sentence 
hearing, the jury shall be instructed on its function and on the relevant law by the trial 
judge. The jury shall then retire to deliberate concerning the advisory verdict it is to 
return. (e) After deliberation, the jury shall return an advisory verdict as follows:  
 (1) If the jury determines that no aggravating circumstances . . . exist, it shall return 
an advisory verdict recommending to the trial court that the penalty be life 
imprisonment without parole; 
 (2) If the jury determines that one or more aggravating circumstances . . . exist but 
do not outweigh the mitigating circumstances, it shall return an advisory verdict 
recommending to the trial court that the penalty be life imprisonment without parole; 
 (3) If the jury determines that one or more aggravating circumstances . . . exist and 
that they outweigh the mitigating circumstances, if any, it shall return an advisory 
verdict recommending to the trial court that the penalty be death.  
. . . . 
(f) The decision of the jury to recommend a sentence of death must be based on a vote 
of at least 10 jurors.  
(g) If the jury is unable to reach an advisory verdict recommending a sentence, or for 
other manifest necessity, the trial court may declare a mistrial of the sentencing 
hearing. 
Id. For Alabama‘s statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in the above 
statute, see id. §§ 13A-5-49, –51, –52. 
 85. See id. § 13A-5-46(a). 
 86. Id. § 13A-5-47 (including determination of sentence by court, pre-sentence 
investigation report, presentation of arguments on aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
court to enter written findings, court not bound by sentence recommended by jury). 
(a) After the sentence hearing has been conducted, and after the jury has returned an 
advisory verdict . . . the trial court shall proceed to determine the sentence.  
(b) Before making the sentence determination, the trial court shall order and receive a 
written pre-sentence investigation report. The report shall contain the information 
prescribed by law or court rule for felony cases generally and any additional 
information specified by the trial court. No part of the report shall be kept confidential, 
and the parties shall have the right to respond to it and to present evidence to the court 
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In Brownlee v. Haley the Eleventh Circuit provided a the 
following procedural synopsis for Alabama capital sentencing after 
the jury‘s advisory verdict:87  
After the jury has returned its advisory verdict at the 
sentencing phase, the trial judge orders and receives a 
presentence investigation report, hears further arguments, and 
may receive additional evidence concerning the aggravating 
and mitigating factors. Taking into account all of the evidence, 
including that introduced at trial and in the sentencing 
proceeding before the jury, the court must then enter written 
findings with regard to the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. Like the jury, the trial judge must determine 
whether any aggravating circumstances exist and, if so, 
whether those aggravating circumstances outweigh any 
mitigating circumstances that it may find. In reaching its 
ultimate decision the trial court ‗shall consider the 
 
about any part of the report which is the subject of factual dispute. The report and any 
evidence submitted in connection with it shall be made part of the record in the case. 
(c) Before imposing sentence the trial court shall permit the parties to present 
arguments concerning the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and 
the proper sentence to be imposed in the case. The order of the arguments shall be the 
same as at the trial of a case.  
(d) Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the evidence presented during the 
sentence hearing, and the pre-sentence investigation report and any evidence submitted 
in connection with it, the trial court shall enter specific written findings concerning the 
existence or nonexistence of each aggravating circumstance enumerated in Section 
13A-5-49, each mitigating circumstance enumerated in Section 13A-5-51, and any 
additional mitigating circumstances offered pursuant to Section 13A-5-52. The trial 
court shall also enter written findings of facts summarizing the crime and the 
defendant‘s participation in it.  
(e) In deciding upon the sentence, the trial court shall determine whether the 
aggravating circumstances it finds to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances it 
finds to exist, and in doing so the trial court shall consider the recommendation of the 
jury contained in its advisory verdict . . . . While the jury‘s recommendation 
concerning sentence shall be given consideration, it is not binding upon the court. 
Id. § 13A-5-47. For Alabama‘s statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to 
in the above statute, see id. §§ 13A-5-49, –51, –52.  
 87. 306 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 2002).  
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recommendation of the jury contained in the advisory verdict 
. . . .
88
  
2. Alabama Cases Post-Ring  
a. Ring‘s Holding Requires Only that the Jury Find an 
Aggravating Circumstance 
Cases decided in the aftermath of Ring provide minimal insight 
into whether Alabama courts‘ interpretation of their sentencing 
procedure has changed following Ring‘s increased reliance on the 
jury in capital sentencing.
89
 The first Alabama case to seriously 
acknowledge the Ring decision was Brownlee v. Haley in 2002.
90
 The 
court noted that: 
The particular importance of the jury‘s role in the application 
of the death sentence has been re-emphasized by the Supreme 
Court‘s recent decision in Ring, which held the Sixth 
Amendment does not allow ―a sentencing judge, sitting 
without a jury, to find . . . aggravating circumstance[s] 
necessary for imposition of the death penalty,‖ and instead 
―requires that they be found by a jury.‖91 
Though the Brownlee court correctly stated the Ring law, it also 
made clear that Ring did not directly address the Alabama sentencing 
scheme involving advisory jury verdicts.
92
 The court did not take 
Ring as an invitation to reevaluate its sentencing process. It instead 
 
 88. Brownlee, 306 F.3d at 1050 (emphasis added). 
 89. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  
 90. See generally Brownlee, 306 F.3d at 1043. The state court mentioned the Ring holding 
in an earlier case, but timing prevented its application. See Ex parte Carroll, 852 So. 2d 833, 
836 n.1 (Ala. 2002) (―Because we are remanding [for a life sentence] . . . issues as to the 
continued validity of the conclusions . . . regarding the effect of a jury‘s recommendation of life 
imprisonment . . . and the authority of the trial court to override such a sentence and the scope 
of the appellate court‘s review must await another day.‖). The importance of this statement is 
that the court, though not yet applying Ring to the Alabama statutory death penalty scheme, 
seemed to recognize the potential dramatic effect Ring could have on the bulk of its death 
penalty jurisprudence up to that point. See generally id.  
 91. Brownlee, 306 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 585). 
 92. ―[B]ut the Supreme Court did not address the constitutionality of the Alabama and 
Florida systems, ‗in which the jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate 
sentencing determinations.‘‖ Id. 
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concluded there was ―no need to address the many complicated issues 
raised by Ring because Brownlee‘s sentence was improperly rendered 
under [other] longstanding principles.‖93 
Six months later, in Ex parte Waldrop, the state supreme court 
recognized that the statutory scheme creates a Ring problem.
94
 Many 
of the section 13A-5-49 aggravating circumstances required to 
impose a sentence of death in the penalty phase restate the section 
13A-5-40 elements of a capital offense, which have already been 
found to exist in the guilt phase.
95
 The court found that at least in 
cases where an aggravating circumstance was part of the murder 
charge,
96
 Ring, ―as applied to the Alabama statutory scheme, 
forecloses the trial court from imposing a death sentence unless the 
jury has unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence 
of at least one § 13A-5-49 aggravating circumstance.‖97  
In Ex parte McNabb, the Alabama Supreme Court extended their 
Waldrop holding to cases where an aggravating circumstance is not 
already included as an element of the capital offense.
98
 Thus, the 
court found that if an aggravating circumstance was not already 
identified during the guilt phase, Ring required the jury to 
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt at least one statutory 
aggravating circumstance in the sentencing phase.
99
  
Though this decision seemed to recognize an obvious requirement 
of Ring—a factual finding by the jury is required to raise a sentence 
 
 93. Id. The court also made one final statement about Ring: ―Plainly, however, Ring 
reinforces our earlier holdings regarding the central role of the jury in the capital sentencing 
process.‖ Id. at 1078–79. The court implies that Alabama had correctly addressed the role of the 
jury and Ring would have no effect on its interpretation of capital sentencing going forward. Id. 
at 1079. 
 94. 859 So. 2d 1181, 1184 (Ala. 2003). 
 95. Id. at 1187–88; see supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.  
 96. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(e) (LexisNexis 2005) (―[A]ny aggravating circumstance[s] 
which the verdict convicting the defendant establishes was proven . . . at trial shall be 
considered as proven . . . for purposes of the sentence hearing.‖). 
 97. Ex parte McGriff, 908 So. 2d 1024, 1037 (Ala. 2004) (interpreting Waldrop, 859 So. 
2d at 1187–88, 1190). While this holding appeared to provide extra Ring assurances, in Ex 
parte McGriff, the court clarified that ―if the indictment charges the defendant with a capital 
offense which . . . already includes one of the . . . aggravating circumstances, . . . then a guilty 
verdict on that charge in the guilt phase of the trial satisfies the requirement of Ring, as applied 
to the Alabama statutory scheme.‖ Id. at 1037; see also §§ 13A-5-40, –49. 
 98. 887 So. 2d 998 (Ala. 2004).  
 99. See id. at 1006; see also McGriff, 908 So. 2d at 1037. 
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to death—the McNabb court complicated its holding by inferring that 
the jury had found an aggravating circumstance despite the fact that 
the jury had made no such explicit finding.
100
 The Alabama Supreme 
Court reasoned that the lower court properly instructed the jurors that 
they must unanimously find the existence of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance before they could consider death, and the jurors most 
likely adhered to that instruction.
101
 Using circular logic, the court 
found that because the jury considered death, it must have found the 
necessary aggravating circumstance,
102
 and the judge could 
permissibly override the jury‘s advisory verdict of life imprisonment 
while still conforming to the constitutional standards of Ring.
103
  
Ex parte McGriff applied and clarified the McNabb holding.
104
 
The McGriff court found that because the defendant was charged with 
a capital murder that did not by its definition include an aggravating 
circumstance, the trial court could not impose a death sentence 
―unless, during the penalty phase of the trial, the jury unanimously 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the aggravating 
circumstance proffered by the State.‖105 The court‘s opinion openly 
articulated for the first time that Ring created the possibility of 
binding the judge to the jury‘s advisory verdict.106 The court noted 
 
 100. McGriff, 908 So. 2d at 1038–39 (citing McNabb, 887 So. 2d at 1006). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  
 103. See id. at 1039; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 104. McGriff, 908 So. 2d at 1039.  
Ex parte McNabb recognizes that Ring, as applied to the Alabama statutory scheme, 
forecloses the trial court from imposing a death sentence for this kind of capital 
offense—one defined by a subsection of § 13A-5-40(a) which does not include an 
aggravating circumstance as part of the definition of the offense—unless, in the 
sentencing phase of the trial, the jury has unanimously found beyond a reasonable 
doubt the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance.  
Id. at 1037. 
 105. Id. at 1038 (citing McNabb, 887 So. 2d 1024). 
 106. McGriff went on to state: 
Section 13A-5-46(e)(1) reads: ―If the jury determines that no aggravating 
circumstances as defined in section 13A-5-49 exist, it shall return an advisory verdict 
recommending to the trial court that the penalty be life imprisonment without parole.‖ 
Ring requires that this subsection be applied in these terms: If the jury determines that 
no aggravating circumstance as defined in § 13A-5-49 exists, the jury must return a 
verdict, binding on the trial court, assessing the penalty of life imprisonment without 
parole.  
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that significant confusion arose from the McNabb court‘s inference 
that the jury had met the Ring standard without clearly finding 
aggravating circumstances.
107
 To remedy this, McGriff recommended 
the use of specific instructions,
108
 and went so far as to suggest a 
prospective direction ―that the count of the jurors‘ votes on the issue 
of the existence of an aggravating circumstance be expressly 
recorded on the verdict form.‖109 
Despite McGriff‘s call for additional procedures to safeguard 
against Ring violations under the statutory scheme,
110
 the Alabama 
courts have done little to hone a consistent method for Ring‘s 
application to their death sentencing statutes. Instead, the current 
trend is to uphold the Alabama sentencing scheme against 
constitutional challenges without any modification or further 
consideration.
111
 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 107. Id.; see Ex parte McNabb, 887 So. 2d 998, 1038 (Ala. 2004).  
Ex Parte McNabb held that even a non-unanimous death recommendation by the jury 
proved that the jury, including the jurors who voted against the death recommendation, 
had unanimously found a proffered aggravating circumstance, even though it was not 
included within the [statutory] definition of the particular . . . indictment, because the 
trial court had expressly instructed the jury that they could not proceed to a vote on a 
death recommendation unless they had already unanimously agreed that the 
aggravating circumstance existed. [McNabb] did not decide whether or how a court 
could deduce from a life recommendation whether or not the jurors had unanimously 
found the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance. The significance of this 
question is that a life recommendation based on a unanimous finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance existed, followed by a conclusion 
that the aggravating circumstance did not outweigh one or more mitigating 
circumstances would be subject to an override by the trial court imposing a death 
sentence, while a life recommendation based on a lack of a unanimous finding beyond 
a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance existed would not be subject to 
such an override. Moreover the Alabama death penalty statutory scheme does not 
specify, and this Court has not yet decided, how many jurors‘ votes would be 
necessary to a determination by the jury that no aggravating circumstances . . . exist.  
McGriff, 908 So. 2d at 1038–39 (citations omitted). 
 108. See McGriff, 908 So. 2d at 1038. 
 109. Id. at 1039.  
 110. See id. at 1038–39. 
 111. See infra Part I.D.2.b. 
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b. Alabama Courts Recite the ‗Override is Constitutional‘ 
Refrain 
  i. Ring Does Not Affect Override: Alabama Procedure 
Does Not Violate Defendants‘ Sixth Amendment Rights 
under Ring 
Tomlin v. State
112
 was one of the first Alabama cases following 
the Ring decision, and though portions of its interpretation of Ring 
were overturned,
113
 much of the court‘s Ring rationale survives as the 
basis for Alabama courts‘ current approach to Ring.114 Tomlin v. State 
explicitly stated that the Ring holding was narrow, finding only that 
the Arizona statutory sentencing scheme was unconstitutional.
115
 The 
Tomlin court further stated that Ring essentially had no bearing on its 
statutory scheme because it did not specifically address whether 
judicial sentencing in a capital case is constitutional or whether 
judicial override is constitutional.
116
 Finally, Tomlin noted that Ring 
also left to the individual states to determine whether any violation of 
Ring could be harmless.
117
 
The Tomlin court relied heavily upon the Harris decision and 
likened Alabama‘s override provision to Florida‘s Tedder standard 
regarding override.
118
 Relying heavily upon this comparison, without 
further evaluation or exploration into the Alabama statute 
 
 112. 909 So. 2d 213 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002), rev’d, Ex parte Tomlin, 909 So. 2d 283 (Ala. 
2003). 
 113. See Ex parte Tomlin, 909 So. 2d 283 (Ala. 2003). 
 114. See, e.g., Moody v. State, 888 So. 2d 532, 602–04 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (―We 
pretermit discussion of Moody‘s other arguments . . . concerning Ring’s impact on his sentence 
of death, because our discussion of the issues above is dispositive of Moody‘s other claims. 
Moody‘s sentence of death does not violate the holding of Ring.‖). 
 115. Tomlin, 909 So. 2d at 281. 
 116. Id. 
 117. ―We therefore rejected the contention that ‗placing the responsibility on a trial judge 
to impose the sentence in a capital case is so fundamentally at odds with contemporary 
standards of fairness and decency that Florida must be required to alter its scheme and give 
final authority to the jury to make the life-or-death decision. Id. at 281–83 (quoting Harris v. 
Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 508–13 (1995)); see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990); 
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745 (1990).  
 118. See supra notes 44, 46–47 and accompanying text. 
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specifically, it concluded that the Alabama statute was 
constitutional.
119
 
Following in the natural footsteps of Tomlin, Hooks v. State,
120
 a 
more recent case, takes the position of completely ignoring the Ring 
claim. Hooks dismisses the claim without analysis as already having 
been considered and not needing to be considered again.
121
  
  ii. Alabama Procedure Withstands Other Constitutional 
Attacks: Alternative Claims of Constitutional Violations 
Dismissed Without Consideration  
Hooks v. State took a similar approach to alternative constitutional 
attacks the defendant made on the Alabama sentencing scheme.
122
 
The defendant argued that the Alabama statute violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him.
123
 He reasoned that 
the statute ―results in the arbitrary application of the death penalty 
based on political pressures.‖124 The defendant also raised a 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim.
125
 Though the 
Hooks court found much of the claim barred because it was not 
properly preserved for appeal, it resolutely noted that ―we have 
repeatedly upheld Alabama‘s capital-murder sentencing scheme 
against constitutional attacks.‖126 A number of cases preceding this 
decision dealt with the issue in a similar manner, summarily 
 
 119. ―The Constitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital sentence. It 
is thus not offended when a State further requires the sentencing judge to consider a jury‘s 
recommendation and trusts the judge to give it the proper weight.‖ Tomlin, 909 So. 2d at 283. 
 120. 21 So. 3d 772 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008). 
 121. Id.; see also Brownfield v. State, No. CR-04-0743, 2007 WL 1229388 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 2007) (―[T]his court noted that both this Court and the Alabama Supreme Court have 
repeatedly held that the United States Supreme Court in Ring did not invalidate Alabama‘s 
death penalty statute.‖). 
 122. Hooks, 21 So. 3d 772.  
 123. Id. at 795. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 792. The court‘s brief constitutional analysis was expanded in a single footnote 
stating that ―[t]his statute has withstood constitutional challenge.‖ Id. at 795 n.17. 
 It is particularly interesting that the courts seem to ignore the Equal Protection claim 
despite the Harris court‘s suggestion that an Equal Protection challenge might be effective. See 
supra note 60.  
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concluding that any constitutional attacks on the Alabama sentencing 
statute are invalid.
127
  
c. Despite Declaration that Alabama‘s Process is 
Constitutional, Procedural Questions are Not Clearly 
Defined by Alabama Courts. 
  i. The Process of Weighing Aggravating and Mitigating 
Circumstances by the Judge: What Does the Jury Verdict 
Even Mean? 
Under Alabama Code Section 13A-5-47, a court must give some 
consideration to the jury‘s recommendation.128 Courts have been 
unclear, however, regarding the weight and value of that 
consideration in the judicial override decision. Some courts have not 
said whether any weight was given to the jury verdict in their 
ultimate decision.
129
 Other courts that have considered the jury 
recommendation as a factor lack clarity as to exactly how it is 
incorporated. In Ex parte Carroll, the court found that a jury 
recommendation must be treated as a mitigating circumstance, and 
that a jury's ten-to-two vote for life imprisonment demonstrated 
―overwhelming support‖ for such a sentence.130 The Carroll court 
also determined that the weight given to a jury recommendation 
 
 127. See, e.g., Spencer v. State, No. CR-04-2570, 2008 WL 902766 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 
4, 2008) (finding that constitutional attacks on the Alabama sentencing statute are invalid); 
Clark v. State, 896 So. 2d 584, 642 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (―[B]oth the death penalty in 
general and Alabama‘s capital-murder statute in particular have been upheld against a variety of 
constitutional attacks.‖).  
 For other examples of cases upholding the Alabama statute‘s constitutionality post-Ring, 
see Ex parte Hodges, 856 So. 2d 936, 942 (Ala. 2003); Ex parte Waldrop, 859 So. 2d 1181, 
1191 (Ala. 2002); Ferguson v. State, 13 So. 3d 418, 425–32 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); Harris v. 
State, 2 So. 3d 880, 926–27 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); Stallworth v. State, 868 So. 2d 1128, 1178 
(Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (opinion on return to second remand); Clark v. State, 896 So. 2d 584, 
596 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). 
 128. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (2009) (quoted in supra note 86). 
 129. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 514–15 (1995); see also supra note 59. 
 130. 852 So. 2d 833, 837 (Ala. 2002). Carroll arose before Ring was decided. Id. The 
judge is able to assess facts outside the purview of the jury. See id. at 835–37; see also infra 
Part I.D.2.c.iii. 
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should depend upon the ―strength of the factual basis for such a 
recommendation in the form of information known to the jury.‖131  
In Ex parte Tomlin, the court rejected a standard of ―serious 
consideration‖ in favor of what they deemed a higher standard of 
―great weight‖ for cases where there was a unanimous jury verdict 
against death.
132
 Relying on Carroll’s assessment that a ten-to-two 
verdict was ―overwhelming support,‖ the court reasoned that a 
unanimous recommendation ―provides even more ‗overwhelming 
support‘ of such a sentence and, therefore, must be afforded great 
weight.‖133 It also found that the weight given to a jury‘s 
recommendation ―should depend upon the number of jurors 
recommending a [life] sentence.‖134 However, the court did not 
define or provide further interpretation of the ―great weight‖ 
standard, and it is still unclear whether all courts follow this standard 
when taking the jury verdict into account.
135
  
 ii. Does the Judge Need a Reason to Override? 
Alabama Code Section 13A-5-47 is silent as to whether the judge 
needs a reason to override a jury verdict.
136
 In fact, by its language, a 
judge must always perform an independent assessment of the jury 
verdict even when the overwhelming evidence is for a life verdict, 
weighing the mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
137
 After 
assessing the jury verdict the judge is free to override it, even if the 
jury was wholly correct in its assessment of the factors.
138
  
Despite a holding in Ex parte Taylor that a judge must set out 
specific reasons for overriding a jury recommendation,
139
 courts do 
not always openly state their reasons. When courts do give reasons 
 
 131. Carroll, 852 So. 2d at 836. 
 132. Ex parte Tomlin, 909 So. 2d 283, 286 (Ala. 2003). 
 133. Id. at 287. 
 134. Id. at 286 (citing Carroll, 852 So. 2d at 836). 
 135. See id. 
 136. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (2009) (quoted in supra note 86). 
 137. See id. 
 138. It is particularly concerning that the judge has this ability since judges are not given a 
formula for weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances under Section 13A-5-47, 
but the jury is given a formula to follow in their assessment under Section 13A-5-46(d)–(g). See 
supra notes 84, 86.  
 139. 808 So. 2d 1215, 1219 (Ala. 2001); see also supra note 86. 
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for overriding a jury‘s verdict, they are extremely varied and utterly 
inconsistent, failing to provide a defendant with any guess as to why 
a particular judge might override his jury verdict for life.
140
  
In addition, courts have imposed the death sentence by judicial 
override in cases with a wide array of facts, often without explanation 
for the judge‘s decision to override aside from citing the aggravating 
circumstances. The great variety of circumstances indicate how 
unclear it might be to a defendant whether a judge will impose a 
death sentence in his case after the jury voted for life.
141
 
 
 140. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 514 (1995) (enumerating cases citing these 
reasons); see also Flowers v. State, 922 So. 2d 938 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); Turner v. State, 924 
So. 2d 737, 795 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002). 
 141. The following cases are examples of varying facts leading to judicial override and 
imposition of a death sentence that were upheld by the appellate courts; it is apparent that some 
courts focused more heavily on aggravating factors while others attempted to provide a full 
picture of the facts presented. Woods v. State, 13 So. 3d 1, 37 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (finding 
that the judicial override was valid because the defendant knowingly created a great risk of 
death to many persons in the commission of the offense, the offense was committed for the 
purpose of preventing a lawful arrest, the offense was committed to hinder the enforcement of 
the laws, the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more persons, and no statutory 
or nonstatutory mitigating circumstances existed); Flowers, 922 So. 2d at 960–61 (finding that 
the statutory aggravating circumstances that murder had been committed during the course of a 
kidnapping and robbery and that murder had been especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel as 
compared to other capital murders outweighed the statutory mitigating circumstances that 
defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity and that defendant had been 
eighteen years old at time of murder and the non-statutory mitigating circumstances that 
defendant lacked stable home life, that his mother had died when he was sixteen years of age, 
that he had little formal education, and that he abused drugs); Turner, 924 So. 2d at 790–91 
(holding that defendant‘s lack of prior criminal activity and testimony from his relatives that 
defendant had been a ―nice‖ boy growing up did not outweigh aggravating factors that murder 
was committed during rape and robbery and murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel 
as compared to other capital murders); Brownlee v. State, 545 So. 2d 151, 165 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1988) (upholding trial court‘s findings of no mitigating circumstances and three aggravating 
circumstances: the capital offense was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment, 
the defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or a felony involving the use 
or threat of violence to the person, and the capital offense was committed while the defendant 
was engaged in the commission of a robbery); Hooks v. State, 534 So. 2d 329, 366 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1987) (supporting trial court‘s finding that aggravating circumstances of homicide 
committed during a robbery outweighed mitigating circumstances of emotional and psychiatric 
problems, expression of remorse in confession, and father‘s love for defendant). 
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  iii. Can the Judge Consider Information Not Considered by 
the Jury Despite Potentially Violating the Core Idea of 
Ring?  
McNabb and McGriff demonstrated that Ring required juries to 
find an aggravating circumstance at least beyond a reasonable 
doubt.
142
 Alabama courts, however, clarified that Ring does not have 
an effect on the override procedure.
143
 Under their interpretation of 
Ring, the fact that the judge takes information into consideration that 
the jury is not able to see and evaluate is not problematic.
144
 The 
Alabama Supreme Court recognized that a judge may consider 
aggravating and mitigating evidence not presented to the jury.
145
 
―[T]he jury's recommendation may be overridden based upon 
 
 142. See supra notes 98–109 and accompanying text.  
 143. See, e.g., Carroll, 852 So. 2d at 836; Flowers, 922 So. 2d at 959. 
 144. In an old case regarding judicial override, Justice Murphy wrote an apropos dissent, 
finding the judge‘s use of inadmissible information an unconstitutional process and highlighting 
the importance of the jury‘s decision. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 253 (1949) 
(Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Murphy makes compelling points regarding the use of 
information outside of the jury: 
[I]n spite of the shocking character of the crime of which they found him guilty, [the 
jurors] were unwilling to decree that [the defendant‘s] life should be taken. In our 
criminal courts the jury sits as the representative of the community; its voice is that of 
the society against which the crime was committed. A judge, even though vested with 
statutory authority to do so, should hesitate indeed to increase the severity of such a 
community expression.  
 He should be willing to increase it, moreover, only with the most scrupulous regard 
for the rights of the defendant. The record before us indicates that the judge exercised 
his discretion to deprive a man of his life, in reliance on material made available to 
him in a probation report, consisting almost entirely of evidence that would have been 
inadmissible at the trial. Some, such as allegations of prior crimes, was irrelevant. 
Much was incompetent as hearsay. All was damaging, and none was subject to 
scrutiny by the defendant.  
 Due process of law includes at least the idea that a person accused of crime shall be 
accorded a fair hearing through all the stages of the proceedings against him. I agree 
with the Court as to the value and humaneness of liberal use of probation reports as 
developed by modern penologists, but, in a capital case, against the unanimous 
recommendation of a jury, where the report would concededly not have been 
admissible at the trial, and was not subject to examination by the defendant, I am 
forced to conclude that the high commands of due process were not obeyed.  
Id. 
 145. Carroll, 852 So. 2d at 835–37. 
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information known only to the trial court and not to the jury, when 
such information can properly be used to undermine a mitigating 
circumstance.‖146  
Based on recent Alabama case law‘s interpretation of its death-
sentencing procedure, Ring is inconsequential and the statutory 
scheme is constitutional, despite having no standard for evaluating 
the jury verdict, no articulated reason for the override decision, and 
the fact that the judge can consider additional information not given 
to the jury in making his determination to override a jury verdict of 
life.
147
 The courts‘ failure to further consider these varied and unclear 
procedural issues demonstrates the lack of consistency in Alabama‘s 
sentencing procedure.  
d. Is Appellate Review Effective in Enacting a Standard? 
Despite the state courts‘ unwillingness to explore the overall 
constitutionality of the Alabama sentencing process,
148
 some small 
changes are being made to create more consistency at the appellate 
level pursuant to Alabama Code Section 13A-5-53, which provides 
the standard for appellate review of death sentences.
149
 As an 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. See supra Part I.D.2.b. 
 148. See supra Part I.D.2.b–c. 
 149. Alabama Code requires that appellate courts automatically review cases where the 
death penalty is imposed for the propriety of the death sentence. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53 (2009) 
(addressing appellate review of death sentence, scope, remand, and specific determinations to 
be made by court). 
This review shall include the determination of whether any error adversely affecting 
the rights of the defendant was made in the sentence proceedings, whether the trial 
court‘s findings concerning the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were 
supported by the evidence, and whether death was the proper sentence in the case. If 
the court determines that an error adversely affecting the rights of the defendant was 
made in the sentence proceedings or that one or more of the trial court‘s findings 
concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances were not supported by the 
evidence, it shall remand the case for new proceedings to the extent necessary to 
correct the error or errors. If the appellate court finds that no error adversely affecting 
the rights of the defendant was made in the sentence proceedings and that the trial 
court‘s findings concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances were supported 
by the evidence, it shall proceed to review the propriety of the decision that death was 
the proper sentence.  
Id. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals is expected to consider:  
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example, in Spencer v. State
150
 the Criminal Court of Appeals 
reviewed the trial court‘s opinion for plain error, assessing in depth 
the trial judge‘s sentencing order overriding the jury‘s 
recommendation of life without parole.
151
 The appellate court found 
that the trial court had adequately reviewed statutory aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, but it had failed to definitively find 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances required by the statute.
152
 
Relying on recent precedent noting a lack of clearly identified 
mitigating factors,
153
 the Spencer court found that trial courts must 
―specifically identify in [their] sentencing order[s] those nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances that [they found] to exist.‖154  
Though Spencer v. State correctly found that prior case law 
requires specific findings of weight given to the jury‘s 
recommendation and the reason for the judicial override, the problem 
remains the same: there is no articulated standard for either 
requirement. Therefore, regardless of attempts at higher scrutiny by 
appellate courts, Alabama courts on the whole still refuse to articulate 
 
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; 
(2) Whether an independent weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
at the appellate level indicates that death was the proper sentence; and  
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. 
 (c) The Court of Criminal Appeals shall explicitly address each of the three questions 
specified in subsection (b) of this section in every case it reviews in which a sentence 
of death has been imposed. 
Id. 
 150. No. CR-04-2570, 2008 WL 902766 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2008). 
 151. Id. at *30. The sentencing report should always be reviewed, according to section 
13A-5-53 of the Alabama code. See § 13A-5-53 (quoted in supra note 149).  
 152. Spencer, 2008 WL 902766, at *30. For a list of mitigating circumstances, see supra 
note 16.  
 153. Morrow v. State, 928 So. 2d 315, 326 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (finding that the trial 
court indicated reliance upon the existence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances but did not 
specify what they were). The court also relied upon Roberts v. State, which required the 
appellate court to independently re-weigh the trial court‘s assessment of the mitigating and 
aggravating factors. 735 So. 2d 1244, 1269 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), aff’d, 735 So. 2d 1270 
(Ala. 1999).  
 154. Spencer, 2008 WL 902766, at *31; see also Scott v. State, 937 So. 2d 1065, 1087–88 
(Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that the trial court ―must make a clear finding regarding the 
existence or nonexistence of nonstatutory mitigating evidence offered by a defendant‖). 
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a consistent method for employing judicial override, and many recent 
cases of judicial override vary widely in the rationale for imposition 
of the death sentence.
155
  
3. The Alabama Death Penalty Broken Down: A Numerical 
Appeal to Logic and Reality 
Judicial override is a prominent factor contributing to the high rate 
of death sentences in Alabama.
156
 The cases that actually make it to 
appeal and whose opinions are published are the exception. Statistics 
provide a more accurate idea of just how skewed the Alabama capital 
sentencing system is in practice, demonstrating a reality that is lost by 
simply reviewing the stronger cases that made it to appellate review. 
As of 2006, Alabama led the country in the rate of new death 
sentences for the fifth consecutive year.
157
 While the rates of death 
sentencing in the rest of the country over the last three years 
demonstrate an average annual decrease of fourteen percent, 
Alabama‘s rate over the same period had an average annual increase 
of twenty-two percent.
158
 In 2008, more people were sentenced to 
death in Alabama than in Georgia, Tennessee, Virginia, South 
Carolina, Kentucky, and Mississippi combined.
159
 In addition, 
Alabama sentenced in excess of eight times more people to death per 
capita than Texas.
160
  
Focusing on judicial override specifically, Alabama is one of only 
three states that permits judicial override,
161
 and it is the only state in 
 
 155. See supra Part I.D.2.c. 
 156. Death Sentences in Alabama, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Feb. 2008), http://eji. 
org/eji/files/02.08.08%20Death%20Sentences%20in%20Alabama.pdf [hereinafter EJI, Death 
Sentences]. As of December 2009, there are 200 people on death row in Alabama. The Death 
Penalty in Alabama, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Dec. 2009), http://eji.org/eji/files/06. 07. 
10%20Death%20Penalty%20in%20Alabama%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf [hereinafter EJI, Death 
Penalty]. 
 157. EJI, Death Sentences, supra note 156. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. 
 160. EJI, Death Penalty, supra note 156; Judicial Override in Alabama, EQUAL JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 2008), http://www.eji.org/eji/files/03.19.08%20Judicial%20Override%20Fact 
%20Sheet_0.pdf [hereinafter EJI, Judicial Override]. 
 161. See generally EJI, Death Penalty, supra note 156; EJI, Judicial Override, supra note 
160. The other two states with judicial override statutes are Florida and Delaware, but their 
override systems give a much more limited power to the judge to override the jury‘s decision. 
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the country that permits trial judges to impose a death sentence in 
cases where jurors strongly favor a lesser sentence.
162
 Thirty percent 
of Alabama death sentences in 2008 were imposed by judicial 
override of a jury verdict for life without parole.
163
 That rate is only 
slightly higher than the death row population of Alabama overall, 
with almost a quarter of death row inmates first receiving a life 
without parole sentence that was changed to a death sentence by the 
trial judge.
164
 Since 1976, judicial override has accounted for eighty-
 
See EJI, Death Sentences, supra note 156; EJI, Judicial Override, supra note 160. In Delaware, 
the only state with both an advisory verdict system and appointed judges, judges overrode 
seven jury recommendations, all from death to life, as of 2002. Adam Liptak, Fewer Death 
Sentences Likely if Juries Make Ultimate Decision, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2002, at 
A21; see also supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
 Tedder mandates that the jury‘s sentencing decision be given ―great weight‖ and requires 
that the facts suggesting a sentence of death be so clear and convincing that virtually no 
reasonable person could differ. See Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975). The Florida 
common law creates a judicial override provision that focuses on whether the jury‘s 
recommendation is reasonable; if so, it is improper to override the sentencing decision. See id. 
Therefore, Florida law requires there to be more than a mere difference of opinion regarding the 
balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances by the judge and the jury. See id.  
 Additionally, the Delaware statute provides: 
If a jury has been impaneled and if the existence of at least 1 statutory aggravating 
circumstance as enumerated in subsection (e) of this section has been found beyond a 
reasonable doubt by the jury, the Court, after considering the findings and 
recommendation of the jury and without hearing or reviewing any additional evidence, 
shall impose a sentence of death if the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence, 
after weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation which bears upon the 
particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character 
and propensities of the offender, that the aggravating circumstances found by the Court 
to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found by the Court to exist. The jury‘s 
recommendation concerning whether the aggravating circumstances found to exist 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist shall be given such consideration 
as deemed appropriate by the Court in light of the particular circumstances or details 
of the commission of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender as 
found to exist by the Court. The jury‘s recommendation shall not be binding upon the 
Court. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (2007) (emphasis added). 
 162. EJI, Death Penalty, supra note 156; see also Eric Velasco, Judge Overrides Jury, 
Imposes Death Penalty, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Apr. 22, 2008, at 1B. 
 163. EJI, Death Penalty, supra note 156. In 2006, one example of judicial override 
included ―Oscar Roy Doster, who received a unanimous . . . jury verdict for [life without 
parole] that the trial judge replaced with a death sentence.‖ EJI, Death Sentences, supra note 
156. 
 164. EJI, Death Sentences, supra note 156.  
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four death sentences.
165
 Though perhaps intended to allow judges to 
override sentences in the opposite direction (verdicts of death by a 
jury changed to life without parole by the judge), this has only 
occurred in a handful of cases.
166
 Meanwhile, other factors contribute 
to the impact and direction of the judicial override statute.
167
  
a. Elected Judges and Alabama Politics 
Judicial override is prevalent partially due to the election of 
Alabama trial judges.
168
 Judges campaign to appear ―tough on 
crime,‖ demonstrating their support of the death penalty and ability to 
impose it effectively.
169
 ―Almost all of Alabama‘s elected state 
appellate court judges campaign on their strong support for the death 
penalty and many promise to facilitate and expedite executions in 
 
 165. EJI, Judicial Override, supra note 160. 
 166. Id.; Victoria L. Coman, Death Penalty Needs Study, Law School Dean Says, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, July 25, 2007, at 4B (―Ninety percent of overrides in Alabama are used to 
impose death sentences.‖); Editorial, Alabama and the Death Penalty, ANNISTON STAR (Ala.), 
July 6, 2008 (―When judges override jury verdicts, it is nearly always to increase the sentence 
to death rather than to decrease it to life . . . .‖). As of 2002, Stephen B. Bright of the Southern 
Center for Human Rights had collected statistics from Alabama showing judges had overridden 
jury verdicts eighty-three times from life to death but only seven times from death to life. 
Liptak, supra note 161, at A21.  
 167. In 2005, the ACLU wrote a report entitled Broken Justice: the Death Penalty in 
Alabama, which detailed six problems the ACLU believes lead to unfair convictions and 
executions, in primarily areas in which Alabama is unique:  
 No public defender system.  
 Prosecutorial misconduct, especially involving illegal strikes of black people from 
juries. 
 Judicial override of jury recommendations.  
 Execution of the mentally retarded.  
 Racial discrimination.  
 Geographic disparities that load Death Row with people from a few counties. 
The report call[ed] for a temporary halt on executions to fix the problems.  
Carla Crowder, ACLU Report Calls for Halt to Executions: Report Lists Problems That Could 
Lead to Unfair Convictions, Executions, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Oct. 20, 2005, at 1B.  
 168. EJI, Judicial Override, supra note 160. The general views of the voting public, 
however, do not necessarily reflect the specific positions of juries hearing individual cases. See 
supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 169. EJI, Judicial Override, supra note 160. 
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order to win votes.‖170 Additionally, ―Alabama is infamous for 
spending and fund-raising practices on judicial campaigns. A recent 
report documents that, since 1993, candidates vying for a seat on the 
Alabama Supreme Court have spent over $54 million on 
campaigns—an amount that far exceeds judicial campaign spending 
in any other state.‖171  
Election of judges in a political climate pervaded by strong anti-
defendant sentiments is already a problematic notion. This bias is 
only magnified by the fact that these judges are spending excessive 
funds on advertising their pro-death penalty stances and then, after 
winning these partisan elections, they are given an enormous amount 
of discretion to hand down the ultimate decision between life and 
death.
172
 The confluence of all of these factors creates a nearly 
insurmountable burden against the capital defendant, one which may 
overcome otherwise important mitigating circumstances.  
b. Alabama‘s Problems with Counsel for Indigent Defendants 
Alabama fails to provide adequate counsel throughout the capital 
process—from trial to post-conviction phases. Alabama lacks a 
statewide public defender system.
173
 The poor are appointed 
unprepared and underpaid lawyers from the local bar.
174
 ―Without a 
 
 170. EJI, Death Penalty, supra note 156. 
 171. Id. For a more in-depth discussion of the role politics play in judicial override 
decisions, see Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 
283 (2008). See also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788–92 (2002) 
(O‘Connor, J., concurring). 
 172. EJI, Death Penalty, supra note 156. 
 173. Id. Olivia Turner, the executive director of the ACLU of Alabama noted, ―The death 
penalty is not imposed on those who have committed the worst crimes. It‘s imposed on those 
who have the weakest representation.‖ Crowder, supra note 167, at 1B (quoting Olivia Turner). 
 174. According to the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
[t]he Alabama indigent defense system is currently divided according to the 41 judicial 
circuits in the state, and there are three representation service models used in these 
circuits. The majority of the judicial circuits use an appointed counsel system. Private 
attorneys place their names on an appointment list and are periodically asked to 
represent indigent defendants for an hourly rate. About ten circuits use the contract 
defender system; private attorneys are hired for a set dollar amount each month to 
handle all indigent cases. A small number of judicial circuits have a full-time public 
defender offices [sic] or a part-time public defender. There is no statewide oversight or 
supervisions of the delivery of indigent defense services in Alabama. 
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state public defender system or resources to obtain adequate legal 
representation, poor people in Alabama are being sentenced to death 
at record levels.‖175  
Alabama generally ―appoints two lawyers to defend each capital 
case. Each must have at least five years experience in criminal law, 
but this can include cases like shoplifting and driving while 
intoxicated. . . . The lawyers must also apply to the judges for state 
money to hire experts and investigators.‖176 Even for capital cases, 
―[t]here is no state oversight of the quality or effectiveness of legal 
counsel for indigents. There are no uniform standards, guidelines or 
training requirements for those attorneys.‖177 Alabama additionally 
hinders defendants by capping compensation at $1,000 for out-of-
court preparation by state-appointed attorneys who are taken away 
from their more lucrative jobs.
178
  
Moreover, Alabama is the only state in the country without a 
state-funded program to provide legal assistance to death row inmates 
for wrongful conviction and state post-conviction proceedings.
179
 
Professor Philip Alston of New York University wrote a report to the 
United Nations finding that death row inmates are inadequately 
represented on appeal, noting that ―Alabama is the only state that 
 
Indigent Defense: About Alabama Indigent Defense, NAT‘L ASS‘N OF CRIMINAL DEF. 
LAWYERS, http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/alabama?OpenDocument (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Indigent Defense]; Val Walton, 75 Lawyers Set for Panel to 
Represent Indigent, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, July 1, 2007, at 19A; see also Mike Odom, Legal Aid 
for Indigent Gets Boost from New Rule, BALDWIN COUNTY NOW.COM (Oct. 28, 2007), 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/alabama023?OpenDocument (referencing the 
prior system for the Northern District of Alabama in appointing indigent counsel: from an 
―outdated list‖ of lawyers with ―various degrees of experience‖). 
 175. Counsel for the Poor, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, http://eji.org/eji/raceandpoverty/ 
counsel (last visited Sept. 18, 2010). 
 176. Sara Rimer, Questions of Death Row Justice for Poor People in Alabama, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at A1. 
 177. Editorial, Poor Defendants Deserve Better Legal Assistance, TUSCALOOSA NEWS, 
June 17, 2008, http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20080617/NEWS/807170301?p=1&tc= 
pg. 
 178. See Inadequate Counsel, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, http://www.eji.org/eji/death 
penalty/inadequatecounsel (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).  
 179. Stan Diel, U.N. Report Blasts State’s Death Penalty, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, July 2, 
2008, at 1. ―Increased hostility towards the plight of the economically disadvantaged threatens 
to undermine the equal administration of justice. Thousands of prisoners in Alabama have been 
sentenced to life in prison without parole and other excessive punishments for non- violent [sic] 
offenses.‖ Counsel for the Poor, supra note 175. 
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does not guarantee counsel after the first round of appeals.‖180 This 
leaves many defendants without an opportunity to review whether 
their trial lawyers were adequate.
181
 Without any other option, many 
death row prisoners were represented by attorneys who have since 
been disbarred, suspended, or disciplined for misconduct.
182
 Some 
lawyers have been found intoxicated or impaired during capital 
trials.
183
 Still, even if a defendant is lucky enough to have an 
extremely competent attorney who knows how to navigate through 
trial and win over jurors with mitigating facts, a judge can single-
handedly overturn a jury verdict of life imprisonment and impose a 
death sentence.  
c. Racial Prejudice 
Another factor inextricably linked to the political climate of 
Alabama is racial prejudice.
184
 Eighty percent of death sentences in 
Alabama are imposed in cases with white victims even though sixty-
five percent of murder victims are African American.
185
 Though 
Alabama‘s population is twenty-seven percent black, nearly half of 
Alabama‘s death row is black, and eighty-three percent of those 
 
 180. See Diel, supra note 179, at 1. 
 181. See generally EJI, Death Penalty, supra note 156.  
Lawyers appointed to represent death row inmates on appeal in Alabama are limited to 
only $1000 for work in each appellate court—a cap that is woefully inadequate to 
compensate lawyers responsible for raising in the state appellate courts every error that 
happened at trial. In some cases, lawyers have actually abandoned their clients without 
notice in the middle of an appeal, causing death row prisoners to miss appeal deadlines 
and forfeit their constitutional rights.  
Id. 
 182. EJI, Death Penalty, supra note 156.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Though the import of prejudice for the purposes of this Note is in regards to criminal 
defendants, it is also significant that none of Alabama‘s nineteen appellate court judges were 
black and only one of the forty-two elected district attorneys was black as of December 2009. 
Id. 
 185. Id. Additionally, as of 2007, ―courts have found that Alabama prosecutors illegally 
excluded African Americans from jury service through racially discriminatory‖ selection in 
two-dozen cases, suggesting both racial bias and prosecutorial misconduct. Project Hope to 
Abolish the Death Penalty, NAT‘L COAL. TO ABOLISH DEATH PENALTY, http://www.ncadp.org/ 
affiliate.cfm?affID=6 (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
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executed since 1976 have been African American.
186
 These statistics 
provide only a small window into the severe racial prejudice that still 
affects the justice system in Alabama. When a capital defendant is 
African American, his already diminished chances of an effective 
presentation of mitigating evidence and a life sentence without parole 
are even further reduced.  
d. Wrongful Convictions 
The possibility and unfortunate reality of wrongful convictions is 
a final important point.
187
 Eight people have been exonerated in 
Alabama alone while one hundred thirty-nine people have been 
exonerated and released nationally.
188
 As of 2009, ―[f]or every eight 
people executed, one innocent person has been exonerated in 
Alabama.‖189 
4. Public Outcry Heard and Ignored by Those with Power 
Several public interest organizations have undertaken independent 
scrupulous review of the Alabama death penalty sentencing scheme 
in recent years,
190
 and it appears that the public backs these efforts.
191
 
 
 186. EJI, Death Penalty, supra note 156. 
 187. In 2008, the United Nations looked into Alabama‘s death penalty, leading some local 
newspapers to proclaim the report ―highlight[ed] unsavory facts, and our state‘s blithe 
acceptance of them.‖ Editorial, Alabama On the World Stage, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, July 3, 
2008, at 4. Regarding the same report, another paper quoted its findings that ―[g]overnment 
officials seem strikingly indifferent to the risk of executing innocent people and have a range of 
standard responses . . . characterized by a refusal to engage with the facts. The reality is that the 
system is simply not designed to turn up cases of innocence, however compelling they might 
be.‖ Editorial, supra note 166, at 1. 
 188. EJI, Death Penalty, supra note 156. 
 189. Id. 
 190. ―The Alabama system is under review by the American Bar Association, the Equal 
Justice Initiative of Alabama and the state chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, 
among others.‖ Editorial, Embracing a Culture of Life, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 11, 2005, at 
8A. Even more recently, a review by the American Bar Association‘s death penalty assessment 
team for Alabama occurred from 2005 to 2006. Coman, supra note 166, at 4. The study 
―concluded Alabama fails to ‗ensure a fair and accurate system‘ for those who are sentenced to 
die.‖ David Person, Editorial, No Justice in the Death Penalty, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Nov. 2, 
2007, at 8A. The Alabama system has even been criticized in the global community. The UN 
issued a report in 2008 regarding its findings of inadequacy in Alabama death penalty 
sentencing. Diel, supra note 179, at 1.  
 191. ―A poll this past summer by the Capital Survey Research Center found that 57 percent 
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There is also a perennial bill seeking to amend the sentencing 
scheme.
192
 Though it continually fails, one version of the bill would 
―prevent judges from overriding jury recommendations on death 
penalty cases, authorize DNA testing for death row inmates, ensure 
that mentally retarded inmates are not executed, and impose a 3-year 
moratorium on executions while a special committee examines 
Alabama‘s capital punishment system.‖193 The year 2010 was no 
exception as the Alabama Senate again introduced a bill proposing 
prohibition of judicial override.
194
 
A recent U.N. Human Rights Council investigator noted that the 
―[m]ost alarming [flaw] . . . [is] Alabama officials‘ refusal to even 
discuss the possibility that the state‘s capital punishment system is in 
need of improvement.‖195 After the report was published, Alabama‘s 
Attorney General, Troy King stated ―I‘ve looked at all of [the report] 
that I intend to look at‖ and went on to accuse the U.N. of ―pushing 
an ideological agenda.‖196 Faced with these and other similar 
responses,
197
 many conclude that Alabama officials are not interested 
in change.
198
 Even worse, some have suspected King of encouraging 
misuse of judicial override through political pressure.
199
 
 
of Alabamians would support a temporary halt to executions while policymakers evaluate the 
fairness of our system.‖ Jim Carnes, Wrongful Deaths, MOBILE REGISTER, Nov. 13, 2005, at 
D1. 
 192. ―[T]he Alabama Legislature perennially fails to pass bills to end the practice [of 
judicial override]. Last week, the House of Representatives voted 37–48 against allowing this 
year‘s bill to be brought up for debate and a vote. That‘s far short of the 60 percent margin 
needed to bring the bill up for discussion before budgets have been considered.‖ Editorial, Life-
or-Death Legislation, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, May 2, 2007, at 8A.  
 193. Samira Jafari, Death Penalty Bills Spark Debate, MOBILE REGISTER, Jan. 26, 2006, at 
B2.  
 194. In January 2010, the Alabama Senate introduced Bill Number 226, to prohibit a 
judicial override. The synopsis states that ―[u]nder existing law, in a capital case, the jury may 
recommend to the court the sentence of a person convicted of a capital offense, but the court is 
not required to accept the jury‘s recommendation. This bill would prohibit a court from 
overriding a verdict by a jury in a capital case.‖ S.B. 226, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2010). 
 195. Diel, supra note 179, at 1.  
 196. Id.  
 197. ―Assistant Attorney General Clay Crenshaw, chief of capital litigation in the AG‘s 
office,‖ looked over a 2005 ACLU report ―which includes anecdotes about five men who were 
released from Death Row after being found innocent in new trials or after appeals courts tossed 
out their convictions. Crenshaw said he‘s convinced most of those men were guilty.‖ Crowder, 
supra note 167, at 1B.  
 198. Diel, supra note 179, at 1. Alabama‘s Attorney General King ―might well have a shot 
at being one of the nation‘s most pro-death penalty attorneys general.‖ Person, supra note 190, 
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II. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
The Alabama courts assume that the constitutionality of their 
capital sentencing scheme is settled.
200
 The question, however, 
remains unanswered by the Supreme Court after Ring, and merits a 
second, closer examination given the persisting inequities in the trial 
courts‘ use of judicial override.201 Though the Supreme Court 
decision in Furman
202
 required a manner of imposing the death 
sentence that was not arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory, 
adherence to this basic tenet has been lost in Alabama‘s statutory 
scheme and muddled judicial opinions.
203
 The clear language
204
 and 
requirements of Gregg v. Georgia are overlooked during Alabama 
death penalty sentencing.
205
 Gregg and subsequent Supreme Court 
precedent definitively require adequate guidelines in sentencing, 
including a consistent method for assessing aggravating and 
mitigating factors.
206
 However, Alabama‘s sentencing scheme fails to 
achieve this consistency.
207
  
Having already upheld judicial override in general,
208
 the Harris 
Court appeared to make the ultimate decision regarding the 
constitutionality of judicial override in Alabama, turning unresolved 
 
at 8A.  
 199. ―Groups pushing for a three-year moratorium on executions in Alabama said . . . that 
Attorney General Troy King put political pressure on judges in two high-profile murder cases to 
get them to override jury recommendations and impose death sentences.‖ Bob Johnson, King 
Accused of Pressuring, MOBILE REGISTER, Oct. 20, 2005, at B1; see supra Part I.D.3. 
 200. See supra Part I.D.2.b. 
 201. See discussion supra Part I.D.2–3. 
 202. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam); see supra notes 10–13. 
 203. See discussion supra Parts I.B, I.C, I.D.2. 
 204. The Supreme Court determined: 
[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures 
that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a general 
proposition these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated 
proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to 
the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the 
information. 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). 
 205. See discussion supra Part I.D.2; see also supra notes 14–18. 
 206. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206; see supra notes 14–18; discussion supra Part I.A. 
 207. See discussion supra Part I.D.1–3. 
 208. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984). 
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issues regarding sentencing over to the Alabama legislature.
209
 The 
Court used vague language to virtually dismiss the issues presented 
concerning judicial override in Alabama, giving veiled approval of 
the scheme and making judicial or legislative changes seem 
unnecessary.
210
  
The Harris court relied in large part on the idea that judges alone 
were capable of imposing a capital sentence,
211
 but Apprendi and 
Ring made it clear that this is now incorrect; the jury must play a 
heightened role in capital sentencing.
212
 What seemed like a decision 
that would alter the state of capital sentencing nationwide failed to 
have significant impact in Alabama.
213
 Alabama courts initially 
struggled to interpret their statute in light of Ring, resulting in 
confusion and contradictory opinions.
214
 However, once the courts 
settled on a substantially limited role for Ring,
215
 there has been little 
if any consideration of the constitutionality of the sentencing scheme 
by the courts.
216
 
Based on the Alabama courts‘ determination that judicial 
overrides are constitutional, opponents to the sentencing scheme are 
left with two options. Fairness in Alabama‘s capital sentencing 
cannot be achieved until either: (i) the Supreme Court recognizes the 
issues and gets involved; or (ii) the Alabama legislature takes action 
and changes its own policy.  
First, the Supreme Court should reconsider Alabama‘s use of 
judicial override and find it unconstitutional. The Court should 
completely disallow the use of judicial override because it violates 
the due process clause, and it cannot effectively provide a method of 
imposing the death penalty that is not arbitrary under Furman v. 
Georgia. In the alternative, the Court could articulate a clear standard 
 
 209. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 513–14 (1995); see supra note 57. 
 210. Harris, 513 U.S. at 514–15; see discussion supra Part I.D.2. 
 211. ―The Constitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital sentence.‖ 
Harris, 513 U.S. at 515. 
 212. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 213. See discussion supra Part I.D.2. 
 214. See discussion supra Part I.D.2.a. 
 215. See discussion supra Part I.D.2.a. 
 216. See supra Part I.D.2.b. 
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and procedure that judges must follow when overriding a jury verdict 
of life without parole. 
Central to the Constitution and to the policy of the Court, the state 
legislature may enact its own provisions for its people so long as they 
are constitutional. When a statute violates the Constitution, the Court 
has a duty to enforce the Constitution and overturn the state statute.
217
 
It seems unfathomable that a statute leading to such gross inequities 
in imposition of the death penalty could possibly comport with the 
Constitution. The Alabama sentencing scheme violates the Eighth 
Amendment under Furman and Gregg as well as due process and 
equal protection rights of defendants under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
218
 
A. The Supreme Court Must Find that the Alabama Sentencing 
Scheme is Unconstitutional 
1. Override Violates the Eighth Amendment under Furman and 
Gregg 
Despite reviewing Harris, the Supreme Court must again review 
the statutory sentencing scheme of Alabama, and this time it must 
find the statute unconstitutional by upholding the basic ideas of 
Furman and Gregg. The bottom line of death penalty jurisprudence is 
that the death penalty cannot be arbitrarily, capriciously or 
discriminatorily imposed.
219
 Even though Harris recognized the 
judicial override statutes, it failed to acknowledge many of the 
underlying issues of the Alabama sentencing scheme that directly 
violated the central ideas of Furman and Gregg.
220
 Arbitrary 
sentencing at the trial level and failure of the appellate courts to 
express a single, clear standard for override make Alabama‘s 
imposition of the death penalty more akin to playing Russian roulette 
than to a constitutionally appropriate determination.  
 
 217. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958). 
 218. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
 219. See supra Part I.D.2.d. 
 220. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (2009). 
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Reading the Alabama statute on its face demonstrates a clear lack 
of an articulable standard for judicial override.
221
 The judge is able to 
override any jury verdict for life without parole, regardless of 
whether the verdict is unanimous in favor of life. Even if the jury 
avoided mistakes and reached a fair outcome, the judge is able to 
override because he disagrees with their decision.
222
 Likewise, the 
judge does not have to proffer a clear explanation as to how he 
considered the jury verdict and the weight he gave to it.
223
  
The low trial standards are not remedied by the appellate 
requirement that death sentencing avoid being arbitrary, capricious, 
or discriminatory.
224
 Trial courts that act in an arbitrary, capricious, 
and discriminatory manner have already imposed the death penalty 
by the time of the appeal. Furman and its progeny held that the 
Constitution guarantees this right at imposition of the death 
sentence.
225
 The right is certainly not fulfilled by first imposing the 
death sentence in a manner that unquestionably violates the 
Constitution, and then providing a remedy to a few lucky defendants 
on appeal. The Constitution and the holding in Furman require more. 
The Supreme Court must find that Alabama‘s statutory sentencing 
scheme is arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment under Furman and Gregg. 
2. Override Violates the Defendants‘ Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Rights  
Alabama courts have never actually dealt with constitutional 
challenges to their sentencing scheme raised by defendants. They 
relied heavily upon the Harris decision, which upheld the statute 
under Furman.
226
 The Alabama courts decided that because the 
override was constitutional under Harris and the Eighth Amendment 
at the time it was decided, it would forever withstand any 
 
 221. See discussion supra Part I.D.2.c. 
 222. See discussion supra Part I.D.2.c. 
 223. See supra Part I.D.2.d. 
 224. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
 225. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976). 
 226. See supra Part I.D.2.b. 
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constitutional challenge.
227
 The mantra of the Alabama Criminal 
Court of Appeals became ―we have repeatedly upheld Alabama‘s 
capital-murder sentencing scheme against constitutional attacks.‖228  
As Justice Stevens recognized in Gardner v. Florida, there is an 
inherent due process issue when death is a possible sentence.
229
 
―[F]ive Members of the Court have now expressly recognized that 
death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be 
imposed;‖ therefore capital-sentencing procedures now require closer 
due process scrutiny.
230
  
The fact that a judge is able to consider facts outside the view of 
the jury and use them to unilaterally impose a sentence of death under 
Alabama‘s sentencing scheme is just one factor that violates 
defendants‘ due process rights. Often the information given to the 
judge is excluded from the jury because it is deemed inadmissible by 
reasoned evidentiary rules that seek to ensure the jury is making their 
decision based upon the appropriate evidence. As Justice Murphy 
stated in his dissent in Williams v. New York, ―[d]ue process of law 
includes at least the idea that a person accused of crime shall be 
accorded a fair hearing through all the stages of the proceedings 
against him.‖231  
A judge exercises unfettered discretion in his decision to impose 
the death penalty, viewing any available evidence that would 
generally be inadmissible.
232
 The judge is inherently biased given the 
political climate, yet he sits with unbridled power ready to overturn a 
decision made by the jury of the defendant‘s peers guaranteed under 
the Sixth Amendment.
233
 In Crawford v. Washington, the Court 
articulated why relying on one judge, who lacks a standard in his 
politically charged decision, is so very dangerous:  
[The Framers] knew that judges, like other government 
officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of 
 
 227. See supra Part I.D.2.b. 
 228. Hooks v. State, 21 So. 3d 772, 792 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); see supra note 126. 
 229. 430 U.S. 349 (1977). 
 230. Id. at 357. 
 231. 337 U.S. 241, 253 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 232. See supra note 142. 
 233. See supra Part I.D.3.a. 
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the people . . . .They were loath to leave too much discretion in 
judicial hands. By replacing categorical constitutional 
guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to 
their design. Vague standards are manipulable, and . . . the 
Framers had an eye toward politically charged cases . . . where 
the impartiality of even those at the highest levels of the 
judiciary might not be so clear.
234
 
Due process cannot possibly be met under a standard where the 
defendant is not aware of what might tip the balance from life to 
death in the eyes of one judge making the fatal decision.  
3. Override Violates Ring and the Sixth Amendment 
At the heart of Ring is the importance of the Sixth Amendment 
and a defendant‘s right to trial by jury. As noted by Justice Murphy, 
―[i]n our criminal courts the jury sits as the representative of the 
community . . . . A judge, even though vested with statutory authority 
to do so, should hesitate indeed to increase the severity of such a 
community expression.‖235 The Sixth Amendment right of the 
defendant to be evaluated by his peers is what Ring v. Arizona relied 
upon to find that capital sentencing requires heightened jury 
involvement.
236
 
Alabama courts‘ narrow interpretation of Ring—that it only 
requires the jury to find the existence of one statutory aggravating 
factor beyond a reasonable doubt—appears feasible without further 
exploration, but comparing Ring‘s requirements with Alabama‘s 
statutory scheme reveals inequities. Alabama Code section 13A-5-47 
allows the trial judge to order and receive a pre-sentence 
investigation report outside the presence of the jury.
237
 The Brownlee 
court described the judge‘s ability (after the jury verdict was 
 
 234. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–68 (2004) (emphasis added) (citations 
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 236. 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). 
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rendered) to ―hear further arguments, and may receive additional 
evidence concerning the aggravating and mitigating factors.‖238 
In Ring, the Court unambiguously found that the Sixth 
Amendment applied to capital cases since ―[t]he right to trial by jury 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished 
if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant‘s 
sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to 
death.‖239 Ring, therefore, requires factfinding on the part of the jury 
when evaluating anything contributing to the death sentence. It is 
difficult to understand how the Alabama courts can provide the judge 
with a pre-sentencing report after the jury verdict that, pursuant to 
statute, contains additional information regarding the defendant‘s 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances and still feel that Ring is 
satisfied. Facts found outside of the jury‘s knowledge should be a 
clear violation of Ring.  
Alabama courts have navigated around this argument by finding 
that Ring merely requires the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
the existence of one statutory aggravating circumstance.
240
 They 
reason that this then makes the defendant eligible for the death 
penalty, and judicial override can be imposed while still adhering to 
the Ring requirement.
241
 A closer examination of Ring reveals this is 
not an appropriate interpretation of its requirements. ―Capital 
defendants, no less than noncapital defendants . . . are entitled to a 
jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an 
increase in their maximum punishment.‖242 Alabama interprets this to 
mean, as stated above, that so long as the defendant is eligible for the 
death penalty by a jury finding of at least one statutory aggravating 
circumstance, the court gives appropriate deference to the jury‘s fact-
finding obligations.  
Alabama courts fail to recall the basic requirements of Furman 
and Gregg. To impose the death sentence, the sentencer must find 
that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors in 
 
 238. Id. 
 239. 536 U.S. at 609. 
 240. See discussion supra Part I.D.2.b. 
 241. See discussion supra Part I.D.2; see also Ex parte Waldrop, 859 So. 2d 1181, 1187–
88, 1190 (Ala. 2003). 
 242. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589 (emphasis added). 
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sentencing. Therefore, a defendant is not truly eligible for the death 
penalty until this finding has been made. Simply because a jury finds 
one statutory aggravating circumstance does not actually make the 
defendant eligible for death. Constitutionally, it makes him eligible 
for a fair, nonarbitrary, and balanced evaluation of the specific 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances in his case to see if death is 
an appropriate remedy over life in prison without parole.  
The Alabama courts‘ death-favoring interpretation of Ring takes 
power from the jury. It undermines the Sixth Amendment guarantee 
of a jury trial that was affirmed by Ring.
243
 The Alabama courts only 
provide part of the jury trial guaranteed to the defendant instead of 
the whole guarantee. Alabama courts allow the jury to participate in 
the most minimal way possible and assert it is perfectly 
constitutionally acceptable. It is not.  
B. If the Supreme Court Cannot Provide a Remedy, the Legislature 
Must Do So 
If the decision of the Alabama courts to disregard Ring is not 
granted review by the Supreme Court, or worse, is reviewed and 
again given a cursory glance and held to pass the bare minimum 
standards of constitutionality, defendants facing death must look for 
alternative avenues of change. Luckily, public interest organizations 
in Alabama are attempting to find an appropriate solution by 
critically examining the inequities of the system.
244
 Based on their 
evaluations of statistics and data, many scholars have formulated 
suggestions for mitigating the problem.  
Regarding judicial override in and of itself, the general 
atmosphere is disapproval. Organizations that have evaluated the 
procedure find that it is an unfair method of imposing the death 
penalty, contrary to standards of decency deserved by defendants 
facing capital crimes.
245
 Many commentators have found that 
Alabama uniformly lacks a standard for imposing judicial override, 
which is exceedingly dangerous in a state with a host of other related 
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issues, such as lack of indigent counsel, racial disparities, a politically 
charged climate with judges elected to their posts, and a history of 
uncovered wrongful convictions.
246
 The confluence of these factors 
leads to gross inequities in Alabama‘s death sentencing.247 
This is undoubtedly a very complicated issue, one that cannot be 
solved in a clear, step-by-step process. There are a multitude of 
factors that would need to be addressed before judicial override could 
become an appropriate manner of imposing death sentences. Thus, 
the most logical and simple solution is to erase judicial override from 
the Alabama statute. Sadly, this is unlikely given the political stance 
of many Alabama legislators and their past decisions to maintain the 
override procedure.
248
 It is encouraging that there is a drive within the 
state to find ways to remedy the problem, but the reality is (without 
the Supreme Court‘s involvement) it cannot be altered until either the 
legislature completely changes its mind or the Alabama courts 
recognize the issues and get involved.  
If the legislature does choose to alter the current statutory death 
sentencing scheme, it should narrow the judicial override provision 
by providing a clear standard the judge must satisfy before overriding 
a jury verdict. In addition, judicial override could be dramatically 
altered (and fairness in sentencing increased) if the legislature 
addresses other factors contributing to the unfairness and inequities 
of Alabama‘s death sentencing, such as the political election of 
judges and the lack of a statewide public defender system. 
Judicial override can be narrowed by only allowing a judge to 
override a jury recommendation in cases where at least a majority of 
jurors recommend death. This would still give the defendant a life 
without parole sentence under the Alabama statute because a ten-to-
two juror vote in favor of death is needed to impose the sentence. The 
judge‘s sentence would then more accurately reflect the jury opinion 
and give greater value to the role of the jury.  
 
 246. See, e.g., EJI, Death Penalty, supra note 156; EJI, Death Sentences, supra note 156; 
EJI, Judicial Override, supra note 160. 
 247. See discussion supra Part I.D.3; see also supra note 145. See generally Person, supra 
note 190, at 8A. 
 248. See supra notes 194–97. 
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Also, there could be more provisions allowing judges to overturn 
a jury recommendation only when the jurors failed to consider all 
aggravating circumstances or misunderstood a fact of the case. For 
these measures to be possible, juries would need to state their specific 
fact-findings, an easy task for the jury to perform. 
Further, the legislature could provide an exacting standard for the 
judge‘s evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating factors, such as 
only when there are three aggravating factors present and no 
mitigating factors, or a similar formula. The legislature has attempted 
to provide such a formula to jurors for balancing mitigating and 
aggravating factors.
249
 Therefore, it should not prove too difficult to 
articulate an appropriate method for evaluation by the judge. 
In addition, the legislature should elucidate the appropriate weight 
to accord the jury recommendation. The ―great weight‖ standard of 
Ex parte Tomlin requires further definition for judges to employ it in 
a fair and uniform way.
250
 As it stands now, ―great weight‖ could 
mean anything and certainly has no clear and attainable definition. 
Finally, the legislature could require judges to specifically state all 
of the reasons why they feel a particular case merits judicial override, 
and also require that those reasons comport with an articulated 
standard. As discussed above, perhaps the jury made a mistake, or 
there are a defined number of aggravating circumstances present. 
Alternative standards could include what rubric courts have used in 
the past, such as the murder is heinous, atrocious, or cruel as 
compared to other capital murders. If a reasonable basis for override 
is appropriately defined, it might provide an additional standard.
251
 
Judicial override in practice has the potential to improve if even 
the smallest changes are made to death penalty statutes in other 
regards. Short of requiring appointment of judges (though this step 
would positively influence the judicial–political climate), the 
legislature could start by limiting judicial funding for statewide 
campaigns or limiting the issues on which candidates market 
themselves. Judicial candidates might be prohibited from marketing 
their views on the death penalty. Perhaps the legislature might 
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consider limiting judicial campaign reelection funds to less than five 
times the amount the state allots the untrained attorneys representing 
indigent defendants who face capital murder charges.
252
 
Another remedy would be to create a statewide public defender 
system.
253
 Unfortunately, this would be expensive. Still, the necessity 
of its existence should overcome its price. Having untrained lawyers 
who are unfamiliar with the process of representing capital clients is 
tantamount to providing ineffective counsel at appointment unless the 
attorney is motivated to learn or has authorized outside methods of 
paying for all the expenses a capital case entails.  
Other important legislative measures that could be taken require a 
greater emphasis on the presumption of innocence, something the 
Alabama legislature seems to largely ignore. The discovery 
procedures of the state should allow for more ―open-file‖ discovery. 
Also, a statute could be enacted requiring DNA testing if available or, 
at the least, preservation of DNA evidence obtained and a manner for 
asserting innocence during post-conviction on its basis.  
These are but a few suggestions for the legislature to remedy the 
frequency of death sentencing in Alabama due to judicial override 
and other inequitable factors. Because the problems plaguing death 
penalty imposition are so inexorably intertwined, even creating one 
measure of those listed above would surely have positive 
ramifications for the overall process.  
The legislative measures may appear more feasible step-by-step, 
but the Supreme Court should reexamine the effects of judicial 
override on the arbitrary nature of the death sentence in Alabama to 
begin to remedy the gross inequities that current capital defendants 
face. Even if the legislature makes changes now it could only have an 
effect much further in the future; if the Supreme Court gets involved 
and strikes down the law as unconstitutional, many defendants‘ rights 
will be immediately restored. 
When a statute does not effectively channel its objectives, judicial 
intervention is required. Though there is much evidence to the 
contrary, I hope the Alabama legislature intends to follow the 
Supreme Court‘s mandate that the death penalty should not be 
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arbitrarily imposed.
254
 If so, it must reassess its statute and tailor it to 
ensure that the death penalty is given in a way that does not allow for 
discretion of trial court judges and an inconsistent imposition of 
death. The Supreme Court must otherwise step in to ensure Alabama 
no longer arbitrarily sentences defendants to death. 
CONCLUSION  
Judicial override is a serious problem for the defendants and 
citizens of Alabama. It has harsh and lasting consequences. Without 
either a review by the Supreme Court or legislative action, judicial 
override will continue to be the sole reason for the execution of a 
large number of death row inmates, inmates that no one will ever be 
sure were given justice before they were sentenced to die. Twelve 
people may have decided a defendant deserves to live, but he or she 
could die because the hand of one judge placed the defendant on 
death row.  
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